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Abstract
This thesis examines the question of what it means to think about a text as
Atlantic literature. I consider two novels, Melville’s Moby-Dick and Pynchon’s Mason &
Dixon, in their relation to the Atlantic cycle of capital accumulation. I borrow this term
from Ian Baucom, who, drawing on the work of Giovanni Arrighi, argues that the period
extending from the late eighteenth century to the late twentieth century represents a
definite epoch of historical capitalism: an Atlantic cycle of capital accumulation. To think
about these texts as Atlantic literature, then, is to think about how they reproduce the
logic of or understand themselves in relation to this Atlantic cycle, the dynamic engine of
a circum-Atlantic world.
I turn to two key theorists whose work I feel is best suited to each novel. MobyDick is primarily focused on capitalist production as represented by the whaling industry,
and thus I employ Georg Lukács—particularly his model of realism and its emphasis on
revealing the nature of production of a given social field—for my reading of that novel.
Mason & Dixon, however, is less directly concerned with production and instead centers
its narrative on the consumption of Atlantic commodities, which invites a reading that
draws on Walter Benjamin, whose work focuses (primarily) on this stage of capitalist
production.
In my reading of Moby-Dick, I argue that the novel approaches the requirements
of Lukácsian realism, but fails to meet them because of its compositionally eclectic
nature. Because Moby-Dick is inherently contradictory, it does not contain what Lukács
calls the moving center (the force that orients and directs the “totality of objects” of a
given social field, in this case, capital)—or at least not conventionally. Instead, the
moving center is displaced and reproduced figuratively in Ahab’s monomaniacal hunt for
the white whale, leaving the empty shell of its rhetoric on Starbuck: Atlantic capitalism
as contradiction. This, I argue, is not Lukácsian realism per se, but what I term a “realism
of crisis,” as the text encounters its own moving center (capital) in a moment of crisis and
subsequently displaces it (to Ahab).
Mason & Dixon, however, traces the Atlantic cycle across space and, importantly,
through a time that does not simply pass, but accumulates. We see this in the novel’s
ghostliness, in how it represents commodities, and in the Benjaminian constellation of the
late eighteenth and late twentieth centuries—the “bookends” of the Atlantic cycle.
Through adopting a Benjaminian philosophy of history, the text reveals how the Atlantic
cycle is composed not of discrete and isolated past moments moving through the empty,
homogeneous time of capitalist modernity, but rather of nonsynchronously
contemporaneous moments accumulating in the wake of a singular historical catastrophe.
That catastrophe, Pynchon’s “the Day,” is analogous to the Atlantic cycle of
accumulation.
Both novels encounter the logic of capitalist accumulation and respond in turn
with an alternative form of accumulation. In Moby-Dick, we see a trend of literary
accumulation (the “nonrealist” element) that seeks to counteract the brutalizing reality of
the logic of capitalist accumulation (uncovered by the “realist” element). And in Mason
& Dixon, we see an accumulative (Benjaminian) philosophy of history that seeks to
counteract the empty time of capitalist modernity, and articulates itself as a politics of
melancholy.
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Introduction
Atlantic Narratives
Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick and Thomas Pynchon’s Mason & Dixon are as
alike as they are different. While the former occupies an unquestioned, nearly sacred
position in the canon of American literature and has been the subject of countless studies,
the latter is less secure canonically and has attracted the attention of few outside the
world of Pynchon criticism. But they share several key characteristics. Both are massive,
occasionally unwieldy texts with encyclopedic tendencies; both resist easy categorization,
generic or otherwise; and both attempt to portray a world of epic scope.
And both, I will argue, are fundamentally Atlantic.
What does it mean for us to understand a text as Atlantic literature? And, perhaps
the more important question, why does it matter? In the pages that follow I will attempt
to respond to this first question through my readings of Moby-Dick and Mason & Dixon.
They are only two texts among many possible choices, so I will not claim my argument
to be in any sense an exhaustive exploration of the notion of Atlantic literature. I claim
only to offer two readings that might help influence how we think about these novels in
particular and about Atlantic literature in general.
But again, why bother? Do we really need another literary category, another label
to affix to works that seem to resist being categorized in the first place? In this case, I
believe we do. My project, however, is not related to the bourgeois impulse to categorize,
compartmentalize, and systematize the entire world (or at least, I hope it is not). Rather, I
find Atlantic literature a useful and highly significant category in that it gives us a
foundation from which to launch a critique of the historical processes that have

produced—and continue to shape—our present moment. To put it another way, thinking
about the Atlantic means thinking about capitalist modernity, as Paul Gilroy, Édouard
Glissant, and others have convincingly demonstrated.1 By situating a text within the
framework of Atlantic literature, we can reveal certain currents of modernity or open up
discourses of counter-modernity in ways that are otherwise unavailable. Precisely how we
can do so may not be entirely clear at this point, but my readings of Moby-Dick and
Mason & Dixon will make this more apparent.
First, I should be clear about what exactly I mean by “Atlantic.” Typically, we
imagine the Atlantic as, well, an ocean: a vast emptiness. It is an abstract space, a
nothingness, only the “in-between” in which we wait while in transit from one piece of
land to another—an ocean that separates, a place of little significance other than what it is
not: not Europe, not Africa, not the Americas. This in turn shapes how we usually
categorize literature; we talk about “British literature” or “American literature,” but never
about a literature that is not directly tied to a territorial space on land, never a literature
that is oriented toward the sea.2 The Atlantic, then, counts only insofar as it is a space of
transit from one continent (or territorial literary category) to another; otherwise, it is
insignificant.
Let us imagine instead that the Atlantic is not some great pit full of water
separating one landmass from the other, but a space that brings them together, or, even
more importantly, a space in which an entire New World is created. Bernard Bailyn
argues that it is problematic to speak of Europe discovering a “New World,” and that “we
might better consider [the “discovery”] as a sudden and harsh encounter between two old
1

See Glissant, Poetics of Relation and Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness.
There are exceptions, of course, like postcolonial literature, which is very similar to my project of
thinking about Atlantic literature.
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worlds that transformed both and integrated them into a single New World” (40). This
“New World”—the synthesis of Europe, the pre-Conquest Americas, and, we should add,
Africa—is a circum-Atlantic world, one constructed in the Atlantic basin and
incorporating all the territories that share its shoreline.
More concretely, what binds the circum-Atlantic world together is economic
unity; that is, as a single market for labor, capital, and commodities. Specifically
commenting on a group of British merchants, Bailyn explains how this works:
[The merchants] dealt in slaves, in Florida plantations, in sugar, tobacco, timber,
and provisions; they supplied bread to the British army in Germany during the
Seven Years War, and ultimately became bankers, British estate owners, and art
collectors. The key to all their varied activities was their integration. Debts
incurred in opening plantations in Florida were liquidated by profits in the slave
markets in Africa; huge profits from bread contracts were invested in land deals in
South Carolina and the Caribbean; capital derived from sugar production and
marketing provided capital for commercial loans (35).
The circum-Atlantic, then, can be better understood as a single economic apparatus, an
engine of production and distribution and consumption that binds far-flung markets and
sites of production into a unitary whole, moving capital and bodies and commodities in
vast flows that criss-cross and encircle the Atlantic basin. Through this economic unity
there develops a kind of social unity as well, which we see, for example, in the tradition
of Atlantic republicanism.
But there is more to it than this. In Specters of the Atlantic, Ian Baucom argues
that the circum-Atlantic world is not only a space of capital accumulation, but the site of
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a definite period in the history of capitalism, the theater of an Atlantic cycle of capital
accumulation. Here, he is drawing on Giovanni Arrighi’s claim that historical capitalism
is marked by a series of cycles of capital accumulation, each centered in one geographic
and political theater: from a Genoese to a Dutch to a British and finally to an American
cycle (although into what new form the American cycle is shifting has yet to be
determined). The shift from one cycle to another seems to be motivated by a constant
oscillation between the dominance of commodity capital and the dominance of finance
capital. In Marx’s formula, the accumulation of capital is carried out through a process of
M-C-M΄: money is used to buy commodities which are sold for more money, and
something seems to have come of nothing. Finance capital, however, represents the
constriction of this formula to M-M΄. Through hyperspeculation, money appears to have
left the world of material production and developed the ability to breed money from
itself. As Frederic Jameson has it, money does not remain tied to “the concrete context of
its productive geography” but, “like the butterfly stirring within the chrysalis, it separates
itself from that concrete breeding ground and prepares to take flight” (251). During these
periods, finance capital becomes the dominant form of capital accumulation (M-M΄ over
M-C-M΄) and, Arrighi argues, we begin to see a shift from one cycle of accumulation to a
new cycle.3
Where Baucom departs from Arrighi is in his analysis of the last two cycles,
British and American. Whereas Arrighi’s “long twentieth century” runs from the late
nineteenth to the late twentieth century and basically overlaps with the American cycle of
accumulation, Baucom offers a different model, one that is a bit longer and a bit more

3

This is not a sudden shift, but a process that develops over the course of decades; thus the cycles are not
clearly defined but tend to overlap.
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specific. Following Walter Benjamin’s theory of the long nineteenth century as one that
inherits the commodity logic of the late seventeenth, Baucom’s
more specific long twentieth century runs from the mid-eighteenth century
through the ‘present.’ It is precipitated by the flight of capital from Amsterdam to
London, conjoins the British and U.S. cycles in a single Atlantic cycle of
accumulation, enshrines commodity capital as its nineteenth century midpoint,
and enthrones speculative epistemologies and value forms at either end of its long
durée (Specters 31).
I will return to some specifics of Baucom’s argument in my reading of Mason & Dixon.
For now, it is enough to say that my “Atlantic” is, for this project, Baucom’s Atlantic
cycle of capital accumulation: a historically specific and culturally significant phase in
the history of capitalism, the engine, as it were, of capitalist modernity.
How, then, do Moby-Dick and Mason & Dixon relate themselves as texts to this
Atlantic cycle? How do they understand it, portray it, reproduce it in novelistic
discourse? Quite differently, as it turns out—or perhaps not as differently as it would
seem. First, however, I will begin by addressing something the novels have in common:
their peculiarity. Moby-Dick and Mason & Dixon have the potential to be relatively
straightforward novels, but the former intersperses its main narrative with long and
detailed chapters on whales and the whaling industry, while the latter constantly disrupts
the detailed historicity of its narrative with glaring anachronisms and twentieth-century
references. What does it mean when Melville drops the story of the Pequod to give us a
thorough (and, as it turns out, accurate) description of the nineteenth-century American
whale fishery? And what does it mean when Pynchon uses his impeccably precise
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eighteenth-century narrative voice to make a joke at the expense of “distant and strange”
New Jersey (445)?4
Other critics have attempted to answer these questions, but I find their solutions
problematic. To suggest that the nonfiction element of Moby-Dick exists to represent a
quest for knowledge or that the anachronisms of Mason & Dixon exist to subvert the
notion of historicity are intriguing proposals. To stop there, however, is to offer a reading
that is fundamentally ahistorical and universalist. Instead, I believe that we must examine
these texts—and especially their more puzzling aspects—in a way that is historically
particular and temporally specific: in relation to the Atlantic cycle of accumulation.
In order to do so, I will turn to two key theorists whose work I feel is best suited
to each novel, and can best help us uncover what makes these texts “Atlantic.” MobyDick is primarily focused on capitalist production as represented by the whaling industry,
and thus I employ Georg Lukács—particularly his model of realism and its emphasis on
revealing the nature of production of a given social field—for my reading of that novel.
Mason & Dixon, however, is less directly concerned with production and instead centers
its narrative on the consumption of Atlantic commodities, which invites a reading that
draws on Walter Benjamin, who is likewise focused (primarily) on this stage of capitalist
production.
To understand fully how Moby-Dick is related to the Atlantic cycle of
accumulation—and why it matters—I take up the question of genre. A notoriously hard
novel to classify, Moby-Dick is clearly not a realist novel. But I believe that a theory of
realism, namely a Lukácsian theory, can help us make sense of this text. By enlisting
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Textual citations from Moby-Dick and Mason & Dixon will appear parenthetically by page number
throughout.
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Lukács in this project and reading Moby-Dick through, or perhaps against, his theories of
realism, we can reveal how the novel reproduces the logic of capitalist accumulation. In
this sense, Moby-Dick takes us to the heart of the Atlantic cycle, to the brutal and
unrelenting logic of capital accumulation that engendered our modern world while
unleashing a plague of suffering and misery upon those who inhabit it. This is a long and
winding voyage.
Mason & Dixon, however, offers a different picture of the circum-Atlantic world.
Instead of piercing the heart of its logic of accumulation, this novel carries us along in a
journey that is quite literally circum-Atlantic, surveying the spaces in which a truly
Atlantic world is being born. But what does it mean that Mason & Dixon is a novel
produced in the 1990s “pretending” to be a novel of the 1790s? And why does Pynchon
so frequently and conspicuously seem to subvert the historicity of his text, through
constant anachronism and references to the twentieth century? I believe that while Mason
& Dixon depicts its eponymous protagonists’ journey as a spatial one, it is also showing
us a temporal journey through the circum-Atlantic world, one that requires a different
understanding of history as well as a different understanding of time. For Mason &
Dixon, I will argue, time does not pass, but accumulates. To see how this actually works
in the text and what it means for the text’s relation to the Atlantic cycle of accumulation,
we will turn to Walter Benjamin and his philosophy of history.
One brief note before we proceed: while Mason & Dixon obviously belongs to a
circum-Atlantic world, is this the case, really, for Moby-Dick? After all, the Pequod
begins its voyage in the Atlantic but traverses the entire globe, ending up in the Pacific.
Isn’t this, then, really an international or global novel, more than a specifically Atlantic

7

one? The case would not be hard to make. I believe, however, that Moby-Dick belongs to
the world of Atlantic literature precisely because it is so bound up in a particular industry
of crucial position in the Atlantic cycle of accumulation. While whaling ships did sail
into all seven seas, the whaling industry itself was firmly rooted in the Atlantic—not
necessary the Atlantic Ocean, but the Atlantic economic apparatus, the Atlantic cycle.
This is true of the Pequod; like the vast majority of American whaling vessels in the midnineteenth century, Ahab’s ship is based in Nantucket, tied to the Nantucket market, and
controlled by Nantucket capital. Although its crew is international, the industry it
represents is not, and the power and wealth of that industry is concentrated heavily in
New England. As Ishmael tells us:
Let America add Mexico to Texas, and pile Cuba upon Canada; let the English
overswarm all India, and hang out their blazing banners from the sun; two thirds
of this terraqueous globe are the Nantucketer’s. For the sea is his; he owns it, as
Emperors own empires (70).
Like any imperial enterprise, whaling has a center, and that center is Nantucket, and
Nantucket, like all nineteenth-century American port cities, is bound up in the Atlantic
cycle of accumulation. If we think about the wealth generated by the whaling industry, no
matter where in the world’s oceans it happens to harvest its whales, we find that this
wealth flows back to and is reinvested in the Atlantic cycle. Moby-Dick, then, is the
perfect place to look for the inner logic of this cycle, to get to the heart of the circumAtlantic world.
And thus, like the crew of the Pequod, let us “blindly plunge like fate into the
lone Atlantic.” (115).
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Part I
Moby-Dick, Lukács, and the Logic of Capitalist Accumulation
Though in many of its aspects this
visible world seems formed in love, the
invisible spheres were formed in fright.
Herman Melville, Moby-Dick

The cetological chapters of Moby-Dick, mainly concerned with whales and
whaling and of ambiguous relation to the central narrative, have been interpreted by
critics in a number of ways. Early reviewers were often confounded by the seemingly
hodge-podge nature of the novel, and some regarded this as its major flaw.5 In a review
panning the “absurd” book, the London Athenaeum wrote: “[r]avings and scraps of useful
knowledge flung together salad-wise make a dish in which there may be much surprise,
but in which there is little savor” (Parker 7). Taking a similar stance, the Boston Post
called it “a crazy sort of affair, stuffed with conceits and oddities of all kinds, put in
artificially, deliberately and affectedly,” and not even “worth the money asked for it,
either as a literary work or as a mass of printed paper” (Parker 40). The far less critical
but extremely perplexed Boston Daily Evening Traveller regarded the novel as “a sort of
hermaphrodite craft—half fact and half fiction” (Parker 32).
We are faced with this same question: what to make of Moby-Dick’s
compositional eclecticism? Clearly, it would be unwise to follow the lead of these early
reviewers and write off the nonfiction element entirely. Nor should we necessarily look to
the twentieth-century critics, who, although less inclined to brush aside the cetological
5

See Betsy Hilbert’s brief overview of early reviews in “The Truth of the Thing: Nonfiction in MobyDick.”
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material, still fall short of recognizing its historical significance. Instead, I will propose
an alternative reading of the nonfiction material, albeit a modestly alternative one. And
yet, in proposing the reading that follows, in this attempt to answer my first question—
what to make of the novel’s puzzling heterogeneity—I will have raised a second
question: how can we think about Moby-Dick generically, especially in relation to the
realist novel? After all, a text that is “half fact and half fiction” certainly sounds like a
sort of realism. Moby-Dick, however, resists such easy efforts at categorization, and
cannot comfortably be called a realist novel as such. In addressing these questions, I
believe we can determine just what makes Moby-Dick an Atlantic novel as well as
uncover the text’s relationship to the Atlantic cycle of capital accumulation.
In order to do so, we must first attend to more contemporary critical receptions of
the novel’s nonfiction element. Unlike their nineteenth-century counterparts, twentiethcentury critics have been less inclined to dismiss Moby-Dick’s heterogeneous
composition as “absurd” or “crazy.” Indeed, some have focused their efforts on
determining the nature of the relationship between the central narrative and its frequent
cetological interruptions. In her brief survey of critical approaches to the nonfiction
material, Betsy Hilbert identifies the “Ballast Theory of Cetology in Moby-Dick,”
developed by such critics as F.O. Matthiessen and Howard Vincent (825). This theory
views the cetological material as “the lumpen part of a good novel” whose main function,
according to Matthiessen, is to prevent “the drama from gliding off into a world to which
we would feel no normal tie whatever” (quoted in Hilbert 825). In other words, the
nonfiction element of Moby-Dick exists principally to prevent the fiction element from
becoming too extravagant or removed from the understanding of the reader.
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This theory, perhaps a bit too crudely utilitarian, has been rejected by other
twentieth-century critics. J. A. Ward sees the nonfiction material in Moby-Dick as the
culmination of a tendency that exists throughout the entire body of Melville’s work, an
attempt “to arrive at an understanding of spiritual reality through an understanding of
physical reality” (167). In this sense, the “incredibly intense study of the whale”
represented by the cetological chapters is “a search for total knowledge,” an “effort to
achieve all knowledge through a knowledge of the whale” (Ward 173). Hilbert herself
adopts a similar argument, contending that the eclectic mix of fiction and nonfiction
mirrors “the diversity of human experience and knowledge,” while simultaneously
questioning the “categories and conventions by which we apprehend both fiction and
nonfiction” (829).
While useful in their own right, these theses, I believe, are also problematic. Both
Ward and Hilbert view the nonfiction material as nonfiction first and cetology second.
What I mean is that, according to their arguments, the nonfiction material in Moby-Dick
could really be about anything—cetology, archeology, crypto-zoology—as long as it
serves the “search for total knowledge” or mirrors “the diversity of human experience.”
Of course, the plot of the novel would have to be different: a story about Ishmael the
birdwatcher with lengthy and whimsical digressions on ornithology, for example, could
function in a comparable manner. Regardless of the novel’s subject, the basic relationship
between the nonfiction and the fiction would be the same.
It is true that Moby-Dick is concerned with many things, but, although this may
seem obvious, it is primarily a novel about whaling. The abundance of nonfiction
material related to the whaling industry, as well as its uncertain relationship to the central
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narrative, remind us of this. The cetological material infuses the text with historical detail
that should not be brushed aside but is both specific and significant. (It is no accident that
Melville sub-titled his work, “or, the Whale” and not “or, the Quest for Knowledge.”) To
simply read Moby-Dick as a work about some universal quest for knowledge, or as a
meditation on evil or God, would be to ignore the most basic subject of the novel:
whaling, or, more generally, maritime commodity production.
Moby-Dick anchors the main narrative in what Eric Sundquist, in his historicist
reading of Melville’s Benito Cereno, calls “critical historical moments” (139). Unlike
Benito Cereno, however, Moby-Dick devotes entire nonfiction chapters to its historical
context, and keeps this material relatively distant from the plot itself. Consider chapter
twenty-four, “The Advocate.” Melville has his narrator, Ishmael, diverge from the plot
completely in order to “convince ye, ye landsmen, of the injustice done to us hunters of
whales,” that injustice being the whale-hunter’s lack of recognition (118). Contained in
his argument is a wealth of information related to the political economy of whaling.
Ishmael attempts to overwhelm the skeptical “landsmen” with a veritable wave of facts
and figures:
we whalemen of America now outnumber all the rest of the banded whalemen in
the world; sail a navy of upwards of seven hundred vessels; manned by eighteen
thousand men; yearly consuming 4,000,000 of dollars; the ships worth, at the time
of sailing, $20,000,000; and every year importing into our harbors a well reaped
harvest of $7,000,000 (119).
Although famous for fantastical claims about the whaling industry, Ishmael presents
sound numbers. In his study of the history of whaling in the United States, Eric Jay Dolin
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presents similar figures for “the industry’s most profitable year,” 1853, which was only
two years after the publication of Moby-Dick (206). American whalers did number over
seven-hundred (peaking in 1846 with 735), which, out of nine-hundred vessels around the
world, means that they did in fact “outnumber all the rest of the banded whalemen.”
Additionally, Ishmael’s report of $7 million in profits squares with Dolin’s $11 million
for the most lucrative year, which we would obviously expect to be a bit higher. Because
the details of the cetological material are so true to fact, Howard Vincent claims MobyDick as “the best popular introduction ever written on the subject of the American spermwhale fishery” (124).
Ishmael’s historically relevant—and not to mention accurate—information
effectively stamps the tale with specificity of time and place: the “Golden Age” of
American whaling, which lasted roughly from the War of 1812 to the Civil War, and
revolved around New England, particularly Nantucket. But Ishmael goes further. He links
the main narrative of Moby-Dick not only to an era in the history of the whaling industry,
but also to a specific epoch in world economic history.
Until the whale fishery rounded Cape Horn, no commerce but colonial, scarcely
any intercourse but colonial, was carried on between Europe and the long line of
the opulent Spanish provinces…it was the whaleman who first broke through the
jealous policies of the Spanish crown, touching those colonies…[and] at last
eventuated the liberation of Peru, Chili, and Bolivia from the yoke of Old Spain
(120).
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Ishmael argues that the whaling industry was very much bound up in what was certainly
a “critical historical moment”: the shift away from colonial empire and mercantilist
economic policy toward commercial empire and free trade policy.
This shift was nothing short of a watershed moment in the history of capitalist
development. Paul Sweezy reminds us that, during the early nineteenth century, the
“elaborate restrictions and regulations of the Mercantile system were felt to be so many
fetters on the freedom of capital to expand and enter whatever line of activity it
chose…the maintenance of the empire was costly and seemed to many to be
unnecessary” (297). Sentiments such as these, typified by Adam Smith’s famous An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, fueled the breakdown of
European colonialism in the Americas, and contributed to bourgeois revolts that began in
British North America and quickly spread across the entire hemisphere.6 The “whalemen
who first broke through the jealous policies of the Spanish crown,” then, were in effect
contributing to the demise of formal colonialism in the Americas and the end of the
mercantile system. This subsequently placed the whaling industry in the vanguard of
capitalist expansion and consolidation in South America.
It is hard not to hear echoes of a certain contemporary of Melville’s in this
appraisal of the whale fishery. In 1848, only three years before the publication of MobyDick, Marx wrote:
The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for
the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of
America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in
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See Bailyn, as well as Anthony Pagden’s Peoples and Empires and Michel Beaud’s A History of
Capitalism for more on this period.
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commodities, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never
before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal
society, a rapid development (Manifesto 474).
Ishmael’s assessment of this relationship between European imperial expansion, capitalist
enterprise, and the doomed “tottering feudal society” is strikingly similar to the one
presented by Marx. Or, Melville’s assessment is strikingly similar to that of his day’s
leading theorist of political economy. In this sense, Moby-Dick is far from an escapist
narrative directed away from Melville’s historical context, but rather an active
commentary on that era as he and others (such as Marx) understood it. The text is not
only grounded in the era of the dismantling of mercantilism by capitalist development
and Atlantic revolution, but also evokes contemporary understandings of that particular
era.
This pattern continues as Ishmael discusses the whales themselves. Chapter thirtytwo, “Cetology,” famously catalogues and comments on the order cetacea in an effort to
present “some systematized exhibition of the whale in his broad genera” (145). In The
Trying-Out of Moby Dick, Howard Vincent has shown that Melville drew heavily from
the scientific material of his day for this chapter, even inserting his own sly references to
specific cetologists and satirizing them accordingly.7 Yet the chapter is not entirely
devoted to serious scientific discourse (or to such dubious statements as “be it known
that, waiving all argument, I take the good old fashioned ground that the whale is a fish,
and call upon holy Jonah to back me” – a notion as absurd in 1851 as it is today; 148). In
addition to striking this naturalist pose, Ishmael never neglects to describe the whale as a
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Renowned whaleman and cetologist William Scoresby (“chronicler of the despised Greenland Whale”)
was the target of much of Melville’s satire (Melville considered himself champion of the sperm whale).
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commodity, and as a potential source of exchange value. Whales are ranked in
commercial value just as they are in size or “majesty,” with the sperm whale winning the
title of “by far the most valuable in commerce” (149). Like the aforementioned chapter
on the historical role of the whaling industry, this chapter works to link the fiction
element to the body of contemporary scientific research (i.e. the whales of the “real”
world), and also to remind us that whales are commodities, determined as such by the
era’s dominant mode of production, and assigned exchange value within the scope of an
Atlantic cycle of accumulation.
It seems, then, that the “Ballast Theory” critics may have been on to something by
arguing that the cetological material works to keep the fiction element grounded in
reality. But more than merely keeping the work grounded, the nonfiction element of
Moby-Dick situates the text within a world of maritime production, within an industry
that is but an extension of the vast economic apparatus that once straddled the Atlantic
basin, consuming the labor, the capital, the human bodies, and the natural resources of the
spaces over which it held sway.
This is the idea to which I refer in my critique of Ward and Hilbert. Their
analyses of the nonfiction element effectively strip Moby-Dick of its historical and
material context, reducing the novel to one in which the relationship between the
nonfiction element and the fiction element is ahistorical and (falsely) universalized. We
cannot understand Moby-Dick without considering the historical detail embodied
(although not exclusively) in the cetological chapters. Moby-Dick is of value to our
project precisely because of its “[r]avings and scraps of useful knowledge flung together
salad-wise,” to again quote the London Athenaeum’s review. It is of value because the
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cetological material insists that we do not neglect to think about Moby-Dick as a text
which represents an industry, an arm of maritime production in a specific historical
moment.
If this is how we can best understand the nonfiction element of Moby-Dick, then
we are faced with my second question, posed earlier: does this mean the novel is a work
of realism? The answer is no, but complicated. Despite the historical and material
specificity of the nonfiction element, it would nonetheless be inaccurate to call MobyDick a “realist” novel. Although Melville shows a true commitment to technical realism
in his depiction of the whaling industry, he also incorporates elements of the epic, of
Shakespearean drama, of the Bible, of romanticism, among countless other sources
“flung together salad-wise.” Taken together, these diverse components undermine any
effort to categorize Moby-Dick as a realist novel.
Other critics, however, might disagree with this assertion. We could think about
Moby-Dick in terms of Bakhtinian heteroglossia, and thus excuse the text’s eclectic
makeup as a “diversity of social speech” that is fundamental to the novel as a genre (32).
According to Bakhtin, the “basic distinguishing feature of the stylistics of the novel” is
heteroglossia, a “multiplicity of social voices and a wide variety of their links and
interrelationships.” This certainly seems to be an adequate description of Moby-Dick and,
as Bakhtin would have it, does not automatically disqualify the novel as realism. And he
is, in this regard, probably correct. I, however, am interested in a specifically Lukácsian
model of realism that defines itself against the kind of non-realist forms that lend MobyDick its heteroglossiac nature. A Lukácsian model, upon which I will elaborate shortly, is
most useful for our examination of the text in relation to the Atlantic cycle of
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accumulation because it understands realism in a very particular way. And this very
particular understanding of realism, I believe, cannot be applied without qualification to
Moby-Dick. A sort of broadly defined realism, perhaps; an example of Lukácsian realism,
certainly not.
So what is it? Franco Moretti offers this solution: to understand Moby-Dick as a
“modern epic” among the likes of Goethe’s Faust and Joyce’s Ulysses. These texts, he
argues, are necessarily contradictory—and, to an extent, flawed—attempts at approaching
epic conventions through a kind of modernist form. Because they are “work[s] of
transition, technically revolutionary, [they] cannot avoid being internally discontinuous”
and work “like the bricoleur: one piece at a time” (Moretti 120, emphasis in original).
Moby-Dick, then, is an unwieldy text with encyclopedic tendencies because it enacts a
(problematical) lunge at a Hegelian totality, the essence of the epic.
While Moretti’s thesis is intriguing and undoubtedly useful, I am less eager to
abandon the (partial) claim that realism seems to have on Moby-Dick. Instead of inviting
the creation of a new generic category such as “modern epic,” the nonfiction material
pushes us toward the realm of realist convention; it demands that we acknowledge the
very particular way in which it depicts the world of the novel and how this depiction
functions in the text. And yet, realism cannot claim the entirety of the novel, only aspects
of it. In order to work through this contradiction, I believe it is most productive to keep
realism on the table, particularly the realism of Georg Lukács. Although Moby-Dick is
not a true “realist” novel, it in many ways approaches the Lukácsian requirements for
what constitutes great realism, as exemplified by the work of Balzac and Tolstoy. It may
not be a realist novel as such, but we should think about Moby-Dick in relation to
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Lukács’s theories of realism, and not outside of them. The benefit of such an approach
will be clear as we raise the question of how the novel relates itself to—or, perhaps,
reproduces the logic of—the Atlantic cycle of accumulation.
For Lukács, “true, great realism…depicts man and society as complete entities,
instead of showing merely one or the other of their aspects…[it] means a threedimensionality, an all-roundness, that endows with independent life characters and
human relationships” (Studies 6). Unlike naturalism, which Lukács associates with Zola
and of which he is highly critical, realism does not strive to reproduce a superficial
“snapshot” of average life. Instead, realism portrays society in such a way that its
inherent contradictions are put into “bolder relief”; the resulting picture is a totality, one
in which we see a “society in motion, complete with all its determinates and
antagonisms” (Lukács Studies 89). This means that the project of great realism is to
reveal the social structures that influence and condition the makeup and destinies of the
characters, not only to remain true to historical reality but also to express that reality in
such a way that what is otherwise invisible becomes visible and apparent. As I have
demonstrated, Moby-Dick fulfills the Lukácsian demand for historical accuracy. What Sir
Walter Scott accomplished for medieval England, and what Balzac accomplished for
post-revolutionary France, Melville accomplished for maritime production of the midnineteenth-century through the superimposition of “critical historical moments.” Like
Scott, he demonstrates a sense of “historical faithfulness”: an “authentic reproduction of
the real components of historical necessity” (Lukács Historical 59).
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Furthermore, Moby-Dick makes bold strides toward what Lukács refers to as the
“totality of objects,” a term he borrows from Hegel’s “first postulate of epic presentation”
(Studies 151). According to Ian Baucom, this means that realism
constructs itself from human types but turns those types outward from an inner
world of feeling to set before its protagonists’ minds and challenge its readers and
itself to map the “totality of objects” which collectively compose the entirety of
an historically particular social world (“Inimical” 171).
In this sense, the “totality of objects” must be much more than a mere backdrop or
collection of props; it must help us to “map” or reveal the structural forces of the world
that the novel wishes to inhabit.
We can see this development of a “totality of objects” most clearly in Melville’s
treatment of the commodities produced by the whaling industry. As I have mentioned,
Moby-Dick does not neglect to remind us that whales are themselves commodities,
determined as such by the logic of capitalism, even if they are also subjects of scientific
study (we see this in chapter thirty-two, Ishmael’s cetological catalogue). Going further,
we find that the commodities produced through the hunting of whales are not isolated,
festishized objects, but are inextricably bound up in the barbarism of maritime
production. For instance, an eager Ishmael initially establishes a link between the toil of
“whale hunters” and the commodities they produce when he says, “almost all the tapers,
lamps, and candles that burn round the globe, burn, as before so many shrines, to our
glory!” (119).
This somewhat naively uncritical step toward the “totality of objects” becomes far
more grim as the novel progresses. Later, Ishmael regards the body of a slain whale, and
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laments, “for all his old age, and his one arm, and his blind eyes, he must die the death
and be murdered, in order to light the gay bridals and other merry-makings of men, and
also to illuminate the solemn churches that preach unconditional inoffensiveness by all to
all” (391). Poignant though it may be, the death of this whale is meant to draw our
attention to the suffering of the workers of the whale fishery themselves: exploited,
brutalized, and occasionally killed so that the same “gay bridals” and “solemn churches”
may be illuminated—so that the capitalist economic apparatus and the society it fosters
can exist. This is the true nature of commodity production, and it is made unsettlingly
plain when Ishmael recalls all the death and violence he has seen in the whale fishery.
“For God’s sake, be economical with your lamps and candles!” he cries, “not a gallon
you burn, but at least one drop of man’s blood was spilled for it” (224).
By describing these commodities in such a manner, Melville is making the
invisible structures of production visible, which is precisely the project of Lukácsian
realism. We see that the weddings and other “merry-makings of men” are literally visible
(from the light of the candles) because of the invisible labor of the whalers. But Melville
makes their labor visible by forcing us to see it in the commodities they produce, to see
every “drop of [a] man’s blood” that was spilled for every gallon of whale oil.
Melville continues this pattern, creating a “totality of objects” that encompasses
not just the commodities directly produced by the whaling industry (oil, candles,
ambergris), but also the broader material world that is dependent on this industry. New
Bedford is not a static background of “patrician-like houses; parks and gardens” but
consists of “brave houses and flowery gardens [that] came from the Atlantic, Pacific, and
Indian oceans,” all “harpooned and dragged up hither from the bottom of the sea” (37).
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Similarly, Nantucket is not just the point of departure for the Pequod and her crew, but
the seat of a vast maritime empire: “The Nantucketer, he alone resides and rests on the
sea; he alone, in Bible language, goes down to it in ships; to and fro ploughing it as his
own special plantation. There is his home; there lies his business” (70). These two
locations, the only actual terra firma settings in the entire novel, are explicitly linked to
the broader system of maritime production, and we are made aware that they are, at a
fundamental level, the products of that same system. Furthermore, the image of the
Nantucketer “ploughing [the sea] as his own special plantation” links maritime
production with the slave economy that not only built but, by the 1850s, continued to
exist throughout certain regions of the circum-Atlantic world, the United States not
withstanding. This is the sense of interconnectedness which Lukács argues to be crucial
to the realist novel, the same interconnectedness we see in images of Stubb consuming a
whale steak by the light of the whale-oil lamp, or, even more strikingly, in the try-works
as it renders the whale oil on board the ship, heated by flames fueled by the very oil it is
producing for the consumer market (468).
And yet, even though Moby-Dick appears to fulfill the basic Lukácsian criteria for
“great realism,” even though it shares Scott’s “historical faithfulness” and Balzac’s
ability to depict a “totality of objects,” it nonetheless complicates (or departs from
entirely) other conventions of the realist novel. So I must retain my original response to
our question, is Moby-Dick a realist novel? The answer is still no—but still complicated.
What complicates the novel’s relationship to realism is what Lukács refers to as the
“moving center,” a crucial element in Lukácsian realism.
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According to Lukács, great realist novels must contain a moving center, a force
that is “present, visibly or invisibly, in every phenomenon” (Studies 145). This, as Ian
Baucom explains, means that the realist novel “orients its maps of totality by discerning a
social center of gravity around which all of its linked objects and all its representative
human types orbit, a defining force that disposes and directs the movement of the ‘totality
of objects’ through a given social order’s gravitational field” (“Inimical” 171). Lukács’s
elaboration on the moving centers at work in Balzac and Tolstoy is worth quoting at
length:
Balzac shows how capital, which he—correctly at the time—saw incarnated in
financial capital, takes over power in France. From Gobseck to Nucingen, Balzac
creates a long procession of the immediate representatives of this demoniacal
force. But does this exhaust the power of financial capital in Balzac’s world?
Does Gobseck cease to rule when he leaves the stage? No, Balzac’s world is
permanently saturated with Gobseck and his like. Whether the immediate theme is
love or marriage, friendship or politics, passion or self-sacrifice, Gobseck is ever
present as an invisible protagonist and his invisible presence visibly colours every
movement, every action of all Balzac’s characters.
Tolstoy is the poet of the peasant revolt that lasted from 1861 to 1905. In
his life-work the exploited peasant is this visible-invisible ever-present
protagonist…[which is] visibly or invisibly present not only in every greater or
lesser phenomenon of life—he is never absent from the consciousness of the
characters themselves (Studies 145-146).
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The respective moving centers of Balzac and Tolstoy, then, are contingent on the specific
historical moments of which they write. Lukács identifies finance capital as the moving
center for Balzac’s post-revolutionary France, and an exploited peasantry for Tolstoy’s
nineteenth-century Tsarist Russia, just as Baucom suggests that brutal warfare against
what he calls “inimical life” is the moving center for Goya’s Spain during the Peninsular
War, and perhaps even for the twenty-first-century United States pursuing its “War on
Terror” (“Inimical” 173).
But what about Melville’s nineteenth-century world of maritime production? If
we are to unravel this complicated relationship between Moby-Dick and Lukácsian
realism, we must identify the novel’s moving center: “that immanent, violent,
simultaneously creative and destructive force orienting and directing the swirling
movement of the totality of objects circulating within a historically particular social field”
(Baucom “Inimical” 173). Given Melville’s depiction of a “totality of objects” and his
anchoring of the text in the historical specificity of nineteenth-century maritime
production, we can conclude that the moving center of Moby-Dick is in some way related
to the logic of capitalist accumulation. But how? The visible-invisible finance-capital
protagonist of Balzac’s realism is represented by Gobseck and “a long procession of the
immediate representatives of this demoniacal force,” and the exploited/insurgent
peasantry of Tolstoy’s realism is, of course, represented by the peasants themselves. To
what in Moby-Dick specifically can we assign the role of visible-invisible protagonist, if
we know the moving center must be somehow related to the logic of capitalist
accumulation? One answer might seem like the obvious choice: first-mate Starbuck is,
after all, the most profit-minded of the characters, and believes that he is only “in this
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critical ocean to kill whales for [his] living” (125). Yet, as I will argue, associating
Starbuck with the moving center (at least, exclusively so) quickly becomes a problem,
and the implications for our analysis of the moving center—if one can exist, how and in
what way one can exist—are startling.
First, let us begin with a standard reading of Moby-Dick, which goes more-or-less
as follows:
Only a few days after setting sail from the shores of Nantucket, the Pequod is
struck by a brief, but significant, controversy. Contrary to what they had believed, the
sailors learn that the principal aim of the voyage is not to hunt whales, but, rather, to hunt
a whale: the “white-headed whale with a wrinkled brow and a crooked jaw” known to
those who labor on the seas as “Moby Dick” (176). It is to the hunt of this particular
beast—the same that “dismasted” Ahab, leaving him without a leg—that the entire
voyage will be dedicated. Ahab announces the quest to his crew, saying, “And this is
what ye have shipped for, men! to chase that white whale on both sides of land, and all
over sides of earth, till he spouts black blood and rolls fin out” (177). The crew responds
affirmatively, with a collective “Aye, aye! … a sharp lance for Moby Dick!” and the hunt
is on.
There is a cautious opposition, however, from first-mate Starbuck. Thinking of
bottom lines and New England investors, he asks Ahab “How many barrels [of oil] will
thy vengeance yield thee even if thou gettest it?” (177). Starbuck is unwilling to deviate
completely from the original purpose of the voyage: to hunt as many whales as possible,
generate profit, and create returns for the shareholders. The Pequod, is, after all, a
commercial whaler, not Ahab’s personal vessel to be commandeered in a fit of
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vengeance. To focus the hunt upon a single whale for the sake of revenge is, to Starbuck,
“madness” (178).
Yet Starbuck’s argument for the commercial enterprise is overruled, and he,
eventually, concedes to Ahab’s wishes. Thus the Pequod sets out, driven ever forward by
Ahab’s monomaniacal fixation on the white whale, his all-consuming hatred of it, and his
insatiable desire to bring doom to Moby Dick. Although the voyage begins as an
unremarkable, commercially-oriented one, it swiftly becomes the means for what Ishmael
calls Ahab’s “audacious, immitigable, and supernatural revenge” (202).
Thinking in terms of Lukács and the (potential) moving center of Moby-Dick,
such a reading presents a fatal contradiction. By definition, the moving center cannot be
one man’s “audacious, immitigable, and supernatural revenge”—and yet this is precisely
what seems to triumph over Starbuck’s profit motive and, in turn, shape the course of the
novel. Is Moby-Dick, then, a novel that stands on the firm ground of realism, but has its
head lost in the clouds of bourgeois romanticism? Can we compare the supernatural
motivation of Ahab to Balzac’s finance capital or Tolstoy’s peasantry? I suspect not. Yet
there is, I argue, an alternative reading of Moby-Dick available, one that we can make
sense of through the concept of the moving center, and one that does not see Ahab’s
ultimate motivation as some extraordinary or even supernatural force, but as the
manifestation of a particular logic that should seem much more familiar.
Let us return to the quarter deck of the Pequod, where Starbuck makes his
protestations against Ahab’s project of hunting Moby Dick. This is the first moment we
hear the beast’s name, and when we are first informed of the real aim of the voyage. As
noted above, Starbuck is the only one to raise any objection to the plan. Although he
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claims he is “game” for such a hunt, and “for the jaws of Death too,” there is one
stipulation: the hunt must not come “in the way of the business we follow” (177). To seek
out Moby Dick for the sake of revenge at the expense of hunting other whales for profit
is, to Starbuck, unthinkable. Vengeance, he reminds Ahab, does not yield barrels of
whale oil, and “will not fetch thee much in our Nantucket market” (177). The quest for
the white whale is an unprofitable, and thus decidedly inappropriate, adventure, for the
Pequod did not set sail to chase Moby Dick, but to make money.
Starbuck, then, is presented as the representative of a rational, responsible
capitalism. He recognizes that the hunt for Moby Dick is bad business and opposes it
accordingly. Although he fails to dissuade Ahab from undertaking this project, Starbuck
continues to think in terms of profit and fiduciary responsibility throughout the voyage.
Much later, with barrels of oil leaking in the hold and Ahab refusing to stop and mend
them, the first mate asks his captain, “What will the owners say, sir?” (517). Unlike
Ishmael, who becomes caught up in Ahab’s monomaniacal quest (or at least caught up in
the act of witnessing it), Starbuck never forgets the Pequod’s initial purpose, and his
mind never entirely leaves the commercial realm of the whale fishery.
For maintaining his rational capitalist logic, Starbuck is consistently rebuked and
repudiated by Ahab. During the confrontation over the leaky barrels of oil, Ahab ridicules
Starbuck’s sense of responsibility to the Pequod’s investors, and draws a stark line
between the two of them:
Let the owners stand on Nantucket beach and outyell the Typhoons. What cares
Ahab? Owners, owners? Thou art always prating to me, Starbuck, about those
miserly owners, as if the owners were my conscience. But look ye, the only real
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owner of anything is its commander; and hark ye, my conscience is in this ship’s
keel.—On deck! (517)
Starbuck, “always prating” about the owners, has an allegiance to profit; Ahab’s
allegiance is to his “conscience” wedded to command of the ship. And it is Starbuck, of
course, whose allegiance is ultimately defeated.
The novel works to set up this opposition between the two: Starbuck’s rational
capitalism against Ahab’s ambiguous, “supernatural” motivation. We would logically
conclude that Ahab’s project, so disdainful of investors and profit, is a non-capitalist or
even anti-capitalist one, especially when his concerns are compared to Starbuck’s fixation
on the profit motive. I suspect, however, that this is not the case.
First, let us consider the nature of Starbuck’s motivation. The profit motive, for
Starbuck, is not just about cold obedience to the bottom line. He shows a true concern for
the Pequod’s owners and the commercial responsibility that they have invested in the
crew. And who are the Pequod’s owners? Not a group of super-wealthy New England
capitalists, but “a crowd of old annuitants; widows, fatherless children, and chancery
wards” (81). It is for the benefit of the poor and dependent, then, that the Pequod hunts
whales for profit. Starbuck would probably even agree with captain Bildad’s assertion
that to “too abundantly award the labors” of the sailors would mean “taking the bread
from those widows and orphans” (86). In this sense, profit is a product of the cooperation
between capital and labor, something rightly owed the owners and investors.
This representation of capitalism is a highly superficial one indeed. Starbuck’s
logic is suspiciously tidy, rational, and even moral, and although it recognizes the profit
motive and adheres to its commercial logic, it ignores—or conceals—the inner driving
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force of all capitalist production: the insatiable need to accumulate more capital. It also
fails to locate profit in the exploitation of surplus value, which is a product of labor.
(Even in the case of the aforementioned widows and orphans, we find this distortion.
Owners in name, they control “about the value of a timber head, or a foot of plank, or a
nail or two” each, and nothing more, while the vast bulk of shares belong to Captains
Bildad, Peleg, and Ahab; 81.) Furthermore, Starbuck’s “rational capitalism” is totally
divorced from the horrors of Atlantic production, and, specifically, the destruction of the
Pequod. Consider it this way: we are led to believe that if Starbuck’s concern for the
widows and orphans back in Nantucket had won out, if his “rational capitalist” logic had
not been overruled by Ahab’s supposedly supernatural motivation, then the Pequod
would have never set sail on its fatal hunt for Moby Dick, and everyone would have
walked away a bit more wealthy and a good deal more alive. Instead, Ahab deviates from
the profit motive, neglecting his responsibility toward capital, and the Pequod meets its
doom, suggesting that Starbuck’s “rational capitalism” is actually in opposition to such a
human catastrophe as that experienced by the Pequod’s crew.
If we choose to accept this Starbuck/capitalist versus Ahab/non-capitalist
dichotomy, then we are left with an extremely limited, and even distortive, depiction of
capitalist logic. This is hardly satisfactory given Moby-Dick’s complicated proximity to a
Lukácsian realism that above all demands an accurate portrayal of capital’s ability to
orient and direct a “totality of objects” within a given social field. Or, put more simply,
we cannot assume that the novel merely “leaves out” the logic of capitalist accumulation
in favor of the more superficial and innocuous logic displayed by Starbuck. For this
reason I believe Starbuck is hardly the unconditional representative of “rational
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capitalism” that he might seem at first. Rather, he is, in Ahab’s words, but “a pasteboard
mask” (178). The outward portrayal is of profit motive and commerce, but the more
diabolical stuff of capitalism—its relentless logic of accumulation, its barbarism—is
conspicuously absent.
This contradiction is reproduced in Starbuck’s attitude toward the sea, that stage
on which the tragedy of the Pequod plays out. Late in the voyage, and already fearful of
what awaits them, Starbuck peers into the deep and murmurs, “Loveliness
unfathomable… Tell me not of thy teeth-tiered sharks, and thy kidnapping cannibal ways.
Let faith oust fact; let fancy oust memory” (535). His “pasteboard mask” version of
capitalism is a work of faith and fancy, blind to the sharks that circle in the fathoms
below. If we are to understand Moby-Dick as explicitly situated within a specific
historical context (an Atlantic cycle of accumulation), then we must discard such a
misleading representation of its dominant and defining mode of production. Indeed, we
must take Ahab’s advice, and “strike through” the “pasteboard mask” to reveal what lies
beneath it—although we may recoil at what we find.
If the identification of Starbuck with capitalism is but “a pasteboard mask,” then
what of Ahab and his “supernatural” motivation? Is this, too, a “pasteboard mask”
through which we must strike? Ahab himself poses the question of his motivation,
immediately prior to the final chase of Moby Dick. He wonders what could possibly be
driving him to “keep pushing, and crowding, and jamming [himself] on all the time;
recklessly making [him] ready to do what in [his] own proper, natural heart, [he] durst
not so much as dare” (592). He gropes for an answer, but is sure only that it is some
“hidden lord and master,” a “cruel, remorseless emperor” that “commands” him. We can
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deduce that Ahab lacks total agency in his quest to kill Moby Dick, for he feels himself
“both chasing and being chased to his deadly end” (419). The white whale, he laments, is
“all a magnet!” (482).8 Clearly, Ahab’s “master” is an insatiable desire for revenge, his
“emperor” an unrelenting hatred for Moby Dick. “That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I
hate,” he cries at the start of the hunt, “and be the white whale agent, or the white whale
principal, I will wreak that hate upon him” (178). This all-consuming need to “wreak hate
upon” Moby Dick—at the expense of all other objects—is what drives the captain of the
Pequod.
It is a drive that springs from within him as a kind of internal logic, relentless and
self-contained, and not the product of any outside influence.9 As noted earlier, Ahab
believes “the only real owner of anything is its commander; and hark ye, my conscience
is in this ship’s keel” (517). He rejects the authority of the owners in Nantucket and
asserts his position as “the commander,” who is the “only real owner” of the Pequod.
Ishmael calls his captain the “supreme lord and dictator” of the ship (133), a thought
Ahab echoes in his confrontation with Starbuck: “There is one God that is Lord over the
earth, and one Captain that is lord over the Pequod” (517). As Howard Vincent suggests,
“Ahab acknowledges no law but his own; his search will be carried in self-assertion, not
in self-submission” (75). This hunt is relentless, as Ahab duly recognizes, for he says,
“heart, soul, and body, lungs and life, old Ahab is bound” to the destruction of his
nemesis (552). Starbuck notices that, even while asleep, the eyes behind Ahab’s eyelids
8

When Starbuck says to Ahab, “See! Moby Dick seeks thee not. It is thou, thou, that madly seekest him!”
he is probably right; that is, Moby Dick is not out hunting Ahab (619). Ahab’s desire to kill Moby Dick is,
however, not entirely the product of his own will, and he cannot help but “madly” seek the white whale.
9
Even though Ahab is enslaved to his need to “wreak hate” on Moby Dick, this does not mean the whale is
somehow actively influencing him through its own agency, and we can therefore say that no outside
influence—like that of the whale, the owners, or the crew—compels him forward. It is an entirely internal
drive.
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remain fixed on the ship’s compass: “sleeping in this gale,” he remarks, and “still thou
steadfastly eyest thy purpose” (256).
Ishmael, witness to Ahab’s monomaniacal quest, turns to the supernatural in order
to explain what he sees. (He, as narrator, is also primarily responsible for setting up the
problematic capitalist/non-capitalist opposition between Starbuck and Ahab.) According
to Ishmael, Ahab is simply “crazy” and sees all that “most maddens and torments,” “all
the subtle demonisms of life and thought” in Moby Dick (200). The white whale is “all
evil…visibly personified, and made practically assailable,” and Ahab’s hate for the beast
is “the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down.”
Ishmael’s understanding of Ahab, then, is as a sort of a depository for the collective rage
of the human species. The captain is either a demon or a man demon-driven, and he is
subsequently portrayed as such in the text.
Yet there is a fundamental contradiction in Ishmael’s understanding of Ahab, just
as there is a contradiction in Starbuck’s “rational capitalism.” By examining this
contradiction, I believe we can “strike through the pasteboard mask” constructed by
Ishmael’s narrative and fully reveal the essence of Ahab’s quest for Moby Dick, bringing
us one step closer to understanding the novel’s moving center. Considering the situation
of the Pequod early in the voyage, Ishmael laments:
Ahab had purposely sailed upon the present voyage with the one only and allengrossing object of hunting the White Whale. Had any of his old acquaintances
on shore but half dreamed of what was lurking in him then, how soon would their
aghast and righteous souls have wrenched the ship from such a fiendish man!
They were bent on profitable cruises, the profit to be counted down in dollars
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from the mint. He was intent on an audacious, immitigable, and supernatural
revenge (202).
Herein is the contradiction. Ishmael does not seem able to consider the fact that,
regardless of Ahab’s hidden intention, the Pequod did indeed set sail with “one only and
all-engrossing object”: to create profit for the owners and investors. He must, on some
level, be aware that this is the “all-engrossing” purpose of the voyage, that “profit to be
counted down in dollars from the mint” is the total and final aim, just as it is for all
whaling vessels. It is an idea to which he refers again and again in the nonfiction
material, for he constantly reminds us that whaling is a form of maritime production, a
form of capitalist production singularly driven by the need for profit. (Recall my earlier
discussion of chapter twenty-four, “The Advocate.”) Nevertheless, he still sees Ahab’s
“immitigable” and single-minded project as something alien and “supernatural.”
What Ishmael is seeing without understanding, and what the text is presenting to
us in the most veiled and yet most glaring manner, I argue, is this: Ahab’s monomaniacal
quest for Moby Dick can be understood as a figure for capital’s relentless pursuit of
profit. It is true that Ahab may not be directly motivated by a desire for profit, as
Starbuck claims to be. But his vengeful chase after the white whale mimics the key
driving force behind the Atlantic cycle of accumulation, that which is the same for all
capitalist production: the incessant need to generate profit and accumulate capital,
infinitely.
As Marx defines it, the nature of capitalism is such that it requires the “circulation
of money as capital…[as] an end in itself, for the expansion of value takes place only
within this constantly renewed movement” (Capital 333). This logic of capital is a logic

33

of unceasing movement, of growth for the sake of growth and profit for the sake of profit.
It is a “restless never-ending process of profit-making,” a “boundless greed after riches,”
a “passionate chase after exchange-value” (Marx Capital 334). A monomaniacal “chase”
indeed, one that knows no other object and heeds not the humanity that is left to suffer in
its wake—a “chase” that should sound familiar to readers of Moby-Dick. Just as Ahab’s
lust for vengeance “commands” him like a “cruel, remorseless emperor,” capital (and the
capitalist, who is an embodiment of capital) is enslaved to a “boundless greed after
riches.” Furthermore, the logic of capital, like Ahab’s need to destroy Moby Dick, is
entirely internal, and not the product of any outside influence. Considered in such a light,
Ahab’s pursuit of the white whale is no longer some mad or supernatural adventure, but a
reflection of the capitalist logic that drives the maritime industry of which the Pequod is a
part. This is not to say that Ahab is driven by the same force as capital—the need to
accumulate more capital—but that he is driven in much the same fashion, and with many
of the same consequences.
It is not surprising, then, that the doubloon functions as the principal symbol of
Ahab’s quest for Moby Dick. Ahab announces the hunt by holding the coin aloft and
promising it to anyone who first sights the white whale. He stands on the quarter deck,
“slowly rubbing the gold piece against the skirts of his jacket” and “lowly humming to
himself, producing a sound so strangely muffled and inarticulate that it seemed the
mechanical humming of the wheels of his vitality in him” (176). Ahab’s “wheels of
vitality” propel him forward on his quest, and their “mechanical humming” evokes the
scene of the factory, or, perhaps, the great economic apparatus of Atlantic production
which hums like a machine as it circulates capital, goods, and bodies. This effect is
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produced as Ahab contemplates the doubloon, which is (or at least can be) a material
representation of money-capital. In this case, the doubloon is a form of money-capital, as
Ahab employs it with the aim of creating a new value, one determined by his own inner
logic: the destruction of Moby Dick.10
The text works to link Ahab and the doubloon in ways that are highly significant.
Ahab’s “riveted glance” is “fastened” to the “riveted gold coin,” and he wears on his face
“the same aspect of nailed firmness” (470). Ahab even sees himself in the “three peaks as
proud as Lucifer” etched on its surface: the “firm tower, that is Ahab; the volcano, that is
Ahab, the courageous, undaunted, and victorious fowl, that, too, is Ahab; all are Ahab”
(471). He believes the coin “mirrors back his own mysterious soul,” but we must ask:
does the doubloon mirror Ahab, or does Ahab mirror the doubloon? Here we find a
dizzying circle of meaning, for the doubloon is like a mirror in which Ahab sees only
himself, and yet it is also a literal symbol of money-capital; capital being what is
figuratively reflected in Ahab’s quest for Moby Dick, which is inaugurated by his posting
of the doubloon. In other words, Ahab sees himself in a symbol of something of which he
is also a symbol—that a coin is what reflects his “own mysterious soul” is strikingly
appropriate.
Equally appropriate is the ultimate fate of the doubloon. Near the end of the
voyage, Ahab announces, “I will have the first sight of the whale myself…Ahab must
have the doubloon!” (584). His relentless desire for the whale is momentarily conflated
with a similar need for the coin—for profit—and, in a very circular fashion, what is
figurative suddenly becomes literal. When Ahab does finally gain the coin for himself, he
10

I should reiterate that Ahab does not literally function as a capitalist, but like a capitalist. His inner logic
is not identical to the logic of capital, and he therefore does not lust after the same thing. Instead of
exchange value, he seeks the “value” created by (or embodied in) the act of destroying Moby Dick.
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cries, “Fate reserved the doubloon for me. I only; none of ye could have raised the White
Whale first” [italics in original] (595). In linking the doubloon to the whale, and, in turn,
the whale to the doubloon, the figurative nature of Ahab’s quest is confronted by its
literal meaning. Ahab and the coin are exclusively bound to each other, for Ahab declares
that “fate reserved” it for him, and that he is the “only” one, of the entire crew, who could
have taken it. He is not only the one who does but the one who must expropriate the coin,
the symbol of profit. Significantly, it is the union of Ahab and coin that leads us into the
final catastrophe, the destruction of the Pequod and the death of all its crew, except
Ishmael. In a sense, this scene is a performance of capitalist accumulation and its horrific
human consequences; in it, we see the meaning of our figurative association become
reality, if only for an instant.
When Starbuck encounters the doubloon, however, it takes on an entirely
different function. He sees in the surface of the coin not Ahab’s “three peaks” but this
contradictory image: a dark valley beneath a luminous sun. He remarks
So in this vale of Death, God girds us round; and over all our gloom, the sun of
Righteousness still shines a beacon and a hope. If we bend down our eyes, the
dark vale shows her mouldy soil; but if we lift them, the bright sun meets our
glance half way, to cheer (472).
What to make of his ambiguous interpretation? Recall that the “pasteboard mask” version
of capitalism associated with Starbuck is itself contradictory: it lays claim to the
commercial realm, the profit motive, but does not locate the horrors of Atlantic
production (with which Ahab is firmly linked) in the tyrannical reign of capital. The
doubloon thus reflects the contradiction between Starbuck’s and Ahab’s respective
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versions of capitalism: one is full of “righteousness” and “hope,” while the other is the
stuff of “mouldy soil” in “this vale of Death.” One is falsely (and ideologically) rooted in
a sense of responsibility and even morality, and one spawned by the demonic
machinations of capital in historical fact. One, the mask, the other, the grotesque face
hidden beneath.
But Starbuck’s “rational capitalism” is superficial: it is only a “pasteboard mask,”
or the calm surface of the ocean below which “teeth-tiered sharks” lurk menacingly.
Therefore, even though the surface of the doubloon might reflect a “sun of
Righteousness” existing in concurrence with “the dark vale,” Starbuck is forced to
recognize that this harmony is only temporary—or illusory. He cries, “Yet, oh, the great
sun is no fixture; and if, at midnight, we would fain snatch some sweet solace from him,
we gaze for him in vain!” (472). Here, Starbuck confronts what is below (or behind) the
surface layer—of mask, sea, and coin. After all, the doubloon “speaks wisely, mildly,
truly, but sadly”; it compels Starbuck to peer behind the pasteboard mask and recognize
that the darkness—of midnight, of the depths of the ocean, and, considering our project,
of production—ultimately holds sway over all.
Here, I argue, is where we can locate the moving center—or a variation on the
Lukácsian moving center—in Moby-Dick. If Ahab’s quest for the white whale represents
the logic of capitalist accumulation, a logic of brutality and horror, then Moby-Dick, like
a realist novel, not only reveals certain aspects of a historically particular social field (the
circum-Atlantic world), but embodies in its central antagonism the fundamental logic of
the system it represents. Yet the text contains a crucial contradiction: although Starbuck
should be the literal representative of capital (as Gobseck and his like are for Balzac), his
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is a superficial and misleading logic, one that cannot adequately account for the most
barbaric and essential features of capitalist accumulation. Instead, we must look to Ahab
and his ruthless and relentless chase after Moby Dick, that particular antagonism that
visibly and invisibly affects every character and every situation in the novel. Because the
visible-invisible protagonism of the chase does not depict the logic of capitalist
accumulation literally, we cannot consider it the moving center proper. Yet, because it
represents that logic figuratively, I propose that we can understand it as a displaced
moving center.
Or, going further, I propose that the essence of the moving center is displaced to
Ahab’s “supernatural” quest, while the outer trappings of what it should have been,
Starbuck’s “pasteboard mask” logic, still remain literally associated with the world of
commerce. Taken together, then, we find that Ahab and Starbuck are not set in discrete
opposition to one another (the Starbuck/capitalist versus Ahab/non-capitalist dichotomy),
but are bound up in a dialectical relationship that represents the contradictions of Atlantic
capitalism. Both are therefore necessary for a full understanding of how Moby-Dick
embodies and reproduces the logic of capitalist accumulation, the basic driving force of
the Atlantic cycle.
But the question remains: why? If Moby-Dick so nearly approaches all the
requirements of Lukácsian realism, why does the text employ this figurative association
to depict what could have been expressed more literally? Why this displacement of the
moving center? I can offer two explanations (or, perhaps, a two-part explanation). The
first: because Moby-Dick, no matter how close to realism it may be, nonetheless
complicates and even subverts the project of Lukácsian realism. Melville has no explicit
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allegiance to an accurate portrayal of the world as it is, to the task of the realists or even
the naturalists. Although he may portray a “totality of objects” in such a way that reveals
their interconnectedness as well as the historical and social forces at work behind and
through them, this alone cannot make him a realist. Melville draws upon realism—
perhaps even establishes it as the foundation for this novel—but he also draws heavily
upon romanticism, the classical epic, Shakespearean drama, Miltonic verse, the
fantastical, the fabulous. Comprised of all of these and countless other influences, MobyDick cannot be called a realist novel, and we therefore cannot expect it to function
exactly like a realist novel. Yet, after what we have determined thus far, I am hesitant to
call it not a realist novel. Instead, Moby-Dick represents a sort of realism in crisis, or,
perhaps, a realism of crisis.
What I mean by this is that the displacement of the moving center is not merely
the result of compositional eclecticism. In a psychoanalytic sense, we can read this
displacement as the product of crisis, of extreme personal trauma, the sort of harrowing
experience that dominates the plot of Moby-Dick. Specifically, I refer to Ishmael’s own
experience as witness to Ahab’s quest and sole survivor of its cataclysmic conclusion.
Generally, however, I refer to the force that should be the visible-invisible protagonist of
the novel, but is not: the logic of capitalist accumulation. By displacing the moving center
from a historically accurate force (capital) to a seemingly “supernatural” figure (Ahab’s
quest for the white whale), the text itself reflects a psychological reaction to the horrors
of capitalist production, a mental wound inflicted by a barbarism that “wreaks hate” upon
the psyche and thus engenders this very sort of displacement. The reality is too
harrowing, too traumatizing, and if we think about it in terms of Ishmael’s near-death
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experience on the Pequod or the broader system of Atlantic production, the result is the
same: the moving center must become displaced.
As “realism of crisis,” then, Moby-Dick depicts the “totality of objects circulating
within a historically particular social field” as well as any true realist novel. But it takes
the project one step further, for it does not merely contain a moving center, “that
immanent, violent, simultaneously creative and destructive force orienting and directing
the swirling movement of the totality of objects,” but actually reflects through its very
form an encounter with its own moving center. This encounter—a moment of crisis to be
sure—in turn displaces the moving center to where it becomes manifested figuratively. In
this sense, “realism of crisis” cannot be recognized as true realism. Unlike Lukácsian
realism, the text is not a depiction of crisis, but a product of crisis – the crisis of humanity
experiencing and encountering the logic of capitalist accumulation, the crisis, perhaps, of
modernity itself.
Or, a second explanation, one that is not mutually exclusive to my first: that the
displaced moving center and “realism of crisis” are products of a very specific
contradiction within Melville’s own attitude toward whaling. We should keep in mind
that, according to Lukács, a great realist novel need not be written by a revolutionary, and
that an author does not have to set out with the aim of radically critiquing a given social
field in order to produce a text that accomplishes this very task (Studies 10-11). (For
instance, even though Balzac was politically quite reactionary, he could still produce
works of great realism that depict the contradictions and social structures of a historical
moment; Zola, however, failed to do so, despite being a political radical.) So, the
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question of whether or not Melville would have wanted to critique the whaling industry
or the logic of capital in general is more-or-less irrelevant here.
Regardless of his authorial intent, Melville does carry out this critique through the
text, and (on the one hand) Moby-Dick adopts a project of Lukácsian realism by directing
a critical gaze toward the whaling industry as a form of exploitative—and not to mention
dangerous—production. The nonfiction material (and much of the main narrative)
function as would a great realist novel, according to Lukács: they portray a social field in
such a way that its inherent contradictions are put into “bolder relief,” thus creating a
totality, one in which we see a “society in motion, complete with all its determinates and
antagonisms” (Studies 89). It is, essentially, a grim picture.
On the other hand, there is the material that works against this project, those
myriad influences that I have suggested undermine the elements of realism in the novel.
They do not represent Melville’s attempt to reveal or expose the brutal reality of the
whaling industry, but are rather an effort to glorify whaling, which is basically the same
endeavor outlined by Ishmael in chapter twenty-four, “The Advocate” (118). By
reinterpreting whaling through the conventions of the epic, by creating a Miltonic Satanfigure in Ahab, by weaving Shakespearean soliloquies and Biblical allegory and romantic
tropes into his narrative, Melville’s text works to create associations between high
literary traditions and the whaling industry. And what is most striking is that he does so
by creating a text that is not just “compositionally eclectic” as I described it earlier, but
fundamentally accumulative. That is to say, Moby-Dick is not really a hasty assemblage
of odds-and-ends “flung together salad-wise” but a textual accumulation of various
literary traditions, from the epic onwards. This tendency is especially clear in the first few
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pages of the novel: “Etymology” is a spare gathering of different etymological sources
for the word “whale,” and “Extracts” is a bizarre assortment of “random allusions to
whales” collected by a “Sub-Sub-Librarian” (xxv). While Melville may well be satirizing
a sort of claim to universal knowledge of a particular subject, he also undoubtedly sets
the tone for the novel’s entire literary strategy, one that seeks to glorify whaling by
representing it through the accumulation of high literary traditions.
This project of literary accumulation might seem to contradict Melville’s
alternative project resembling Lukácsian realism. But I believe that the fundamental
conflict in Moby-Dick is not between these two contrasting project—to critique and to
glorify—but rather between two trends of accumulation. The logic of capitalist
accumulation, which is the visible-invisible protagonist of the novel’s social field
displaced to a figurative representation in Ahab’s quest for the whale, is locked in
conflict with the novel’s trend of literary accumulation, which represents Melville’s
attempt to glorify the whaling industry and, in doing so, redeem it from the brutal logic of
capital. The two distinct elements of the novel, not so much “fiction” and “nonfiction” as
“realist” and “nonrealist,” can be oriented in relation to one of these two trends.
To return to our original question: what to make of Moby-Dick’s compositional
eclecticism? It is the product of a contradiction in how Melville portrays the whaling
industry. The Lukácsian “realist” element seeks to reveal the logic of capitalist
accumulation, while the “nonrealist” element enacts a project of literary accumulation in
order to redeem whaling from what the “realist” element is striving to reveal. Thus, the
fundamental contradiction of Moby-Dick: between redemption and revelation, between
the redeeming possibilities of literary accumulation and the traumatic revelation of the
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logic of capitalist accumulation, between the “visible world formed in love” and the
“invisible spheres formed in fright.”
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Part II
Mason & Dixon, Benjamin, and the Philosophy of History
“…what if I can’t just lightly let her drop?
What if I won’t just leave her to the
Weather, and Forgetfulness? What if I want
to spend, even squander, my precious time
trying to make it up to her? Somehow? Do
you think anyone can simply let that all go?”
“Thou must,” Dixon does not say.
Instead, tilting his wine-glass at Mason as if
‘twere a leaden Ale-Can, he beams
sympathetically. “Then tha must break thy
Silence, and tell me somewhat of her.”
Thomas Pynchon, Mason &
Dixon
Brian McHale argues that Mason & Dixon should be understood as an example of
historiographic metafiction. Borrowing the term from Linda Hutcheon, he claims that the
novel represents a kind of “fiction that, by flouting historical verisimilitude in various
ways, including deliberate anachronism, invites critical scrutiny of the epistemological
bases of historical reconstruction” (McHale 47). There is no doubt that Mason & Dixon
“invites critical scrutiny” of how we think about history and how we create narratives of
the past. After all, what historical novel recounting the lives of Charles Mason and
Jeremiah Dixon would have the surveyors converse with a “Learnèd English [talking]
dog,” or cross paths with a violently lovelorn mechanical duck, not to mention any other
of the numerous fantastical and supernatural creatures that populate this text? And
McHale is not alone in his analysis. David Foreman agrees that the “barrage of
anachronisms…corrupts the facts and disrupts the whole retelling of history, infecting it
with the uncertainty of fiction” (162), while Jeff Baker asserts that the narrative “tears the
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fabric” of its “pseudohistoricity with cartoon-like interruptions and hippie-ish
anarchronisms” (177).
These critics are undoubtedly correct in arguing that novel subverts and
destabilizes historical verisimilitude—even, perhaps, that it contests any claim to
historical “truth.” But is that all? As historiographic metafiction (in the sense McHale is
using it), is Mason & Dixon nothing more than a reaction to conventional forms of
historical narrative? Can it do nothing but “flaunt,” “corrupt,” “disrupt,” “infect,” and
“tear the fabric” of historicity? Does it offer an alternative—or is this “corruption” or
“disruption” itself the alternative?
Instead of simply attacking or subverting the historical narrative, Mason & Dixon,
I will argue, is proposing a different sort of historical narrative altogether, or, really, a
different understanding of time: not homogenous and empty, not a single sequence of
events, but something that accumulates. In this sense, Mason & Dixon’s philosophy of
history bears a striking resemblance to the work of Walter Benjamin, particularly his
“Theses on the Philosophy of History” and fragments from The Arcades Project. In
proposing an understanding of time that accumulates, Mason & Dixon also shares the
(Benjaminian) project of “interestedness” that Baucom identifies with Atlantic
“melancholy realism.” And, like a Benjaminian philosophy of history, and like
melancholy realism, Mason & Dixon is unabashedly partisan: it sides with the oppressed,
the victims of empire, and the “wounds bodily and ghostly, great and small, [that] go
aching on, not ev’ry one commemorated,— nor, too often, even recounted” (6). The
project of this novel, if not to “commemorate” or “even recount” each of these wounds, is
to offer an alternative philosophy of history which seeks to do just that.
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How?
To begin with, the novel clearly aims to disrupt a notion of linear, orderly time
through its narrative structure. At first glance, Mason & Dixon is a classic example of the
frame narrative, following in the tradition of The Canterbury Tales or Frankenstein.
Reverend Wicks Cherrycoke is our narrator, relating the story of Mason and Dixon to his
family one “Christmastide of 1786” (6). And although “Pynchon has…taken great pains
in constructing his narrative frames,” as Bernard Duyfhuizen has it, “upon close analysis
his frames seem to be designed to deconstruct themselves,” causing the reader to “lose
his or her sense of where the frame’s edge separates one narrative from another” (134).
Cherrycoke’s narrative is constantly interrupted and questioned, either by other members
of the family or when it collides with other narrative frames. Chapter fifty-three, for
example, begins (inexplicably) with a captivity narrative seemingly unrelated to the story
of Mason and Dixon. This shifts to a first-person narrative, told from the perspective of
the captive herself, which is then interrupted by Pynchon’s third-person impersonal
narrator, telling us that Tenebrae has been reading this captivity narrative in the other
room. We then learn that the narrative is an installment of The Ghastly Fop, a gothic
serial we know from Cherrycoke’s narrative as being popular with Mason and others the
surveyors encounter. Tenebrae and Ethelmer continue reading the captivity narrative, and
without warning its central characters, Eliza and Captain Zhang, suddenly “arrive at the
West Line, and decide to follow the Visto east, and ere long they have come up with the
Party” — with Mason and Dixon’s surveying party, that is (534). Duyfhuizen points out
that “The Ghastly Fop episode dialogically merges with the story of Mason and Dixon,
and before another page goes by Cherrycoke has regained full control of the narration”
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(139). Although probably the most dramatic example of this sort of narrative disruption,
moments such as this occur throughout the entire novel. By consciously subverting the
integrity of the narrative frame, Pynchon is supporting his theme of orderly lines and
linearity versus chaos and nonlinearity, an opposition that, of course, affects how we
think about the novel as a historical narrative as well.
More specifically, both Mason and Cherrycoke muse over the idea of temporal
accumulation, and with it, what kind of history would account for a past that does not
merely “pass.” These passages reject the notion of history as a single, linear chain of
events for a kind of chaotic, accumulative (and, at this point, still ambiguous) process.
After their near-fatal encounter with the French warship l’Grand, Mason and Dixon
speculate over the event, believing that it “seems not to belong in either of their lives”
(44). Mason wonders if there was a “mistake in the Plan of the Day” that caused a “piece
of someone else’s History, a fragment spall’d off of some Great Moment” to fly into their
paths. Shortly thereafter, having received a “Letter of Reproach and Threat” from the
Royal Society (45), Mason interprets the letter’s warning as a kind of reverseaccumulation: “As if…there were no single destiny…but rather a choice among a great
many possible ones, their number steadily diminishing each time a Choice be made, till at
last ‘reduc’d,’ to the events that do happen to us, as we pass among ‘em” (first ellipsis in
original).
History, in both these passages, does not resemble a linear chronology but
something more complex, more irregular. Indeed, this kind of accumulative layering
appears as a trope throughout the novel. Upon seeing the mysterious mound formations
described by Captain Shelby, Dixon marvels at their construction and compares “how
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these Layers are set in” to “all that Fancy Layering” inside Ben Franklin’s “Leyden
Battery” (599). Although Mason is skeptical, Shelby contends that there is “lengthy
Knowledge of such things,— according to which, alternating Layers of different
Substances are ever a Sign of the intention to Accumulate Force,— not necessarily
Electrical, neither.” The mounds, supposedly belonging to an “ancient” time (595), are
layered forms that suggest accumulation, or are themselves accumulative in nature. They
are not unlike the various other layered forms discussed earlier by travelers snowed-in at
the same tavern as the surveyors. Swords produced by the “Armorers of the Japanese
Islands,” Chef Allègre’s “Croissant Dough,” “Gold-beating,” “Lamination,” “the printed
Book,” and “an unbound Heap of Broadsides” all involve the accumulation of various
layers (389) – not to mention Franklin’s battery itself, or the layered physiology of
Felìpe/El Peligroso, the trained “Torpedo” (electric eel) “who nightly discharges into his
Performance all the Day’s dire Accumulation” (432). Daniel Punday associates this trope
with a tension between verticality and horizontality in Pynchon’s work (268); I, however,
suggest that this layering, and especially its ability to “multiply the apparent forces” (390)
or its “intention to Accumulate Force” (595), is related to an idea of time that is itself
accumulative, to seeing history not as a single chain of events but something more akin to
“Layers of different Substances” accumulating.
While the novel only imprecisely approaches this idea in Mason’s speculations
and in the layering trope, it receives a clearer articulation through Cherrycoke. Early in
his narrative, the Reverend suggests that “History is the Dance of our Hunt for
Christ…the Event [Christ’s resurrection] is taken into History, and History is redeem’d
from the service of Darkness,— with all the secular Consequences, flowing from that one
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Event, design’d and will’d to occur” (76). Although this thesis clashes with his later
(more secular) sentiments, it importantly introduces the image of an “Event” out of which
the rest of history will “flow,” as if some force were propelling it. Ethelmer, however, is
not content to leave this image untarnished by “Darkness,” and he reminds us that
flowing from this same “Event” are also “ev’ry Crusade, Inquisition, Sectarian War, the
millions of lives, the seas of blood” (76) – a violent past ever accumulating in the
aftermath.
It is not until we encounter an excerpt from one of Cherrycoke’s sermons,
positioned as the epigraph to chapter thirty-five, that we find the most precise articulation
of the novel’s philosophy of history. Undoubtedly one of the text’s most crucial passages,
it reads:
Facts are but the Play-things of lawyers,— Tops and Hoops, forever a-spin....
Alas, the Historian may indulge no such idle Rotating. History is not Chronology,
for that is left to lawyers,— nor is it Remembrance, for Remembrance belongs to
the People. History can as little pretend to the Veracity of the one, as claim the
Power of the other,— her Practitioners, to survive, must soon learn the arts of the
quidnunc, spy, and Taproom Wit,— that there may ever continue more than one
life-line back into a Past we risk, each day, losing our forebears in forever,— not
a Chain of single Links, for one broken Link could lose us All,— rather, a great
disorderly Tangle of Lines, long and short, weak and strong, vanishing into the
Mnemonick Deep, with only their Destination in common (349).
What is remarkable about this passage is that it is nearly a point-for-point reinterpretation
of Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” When Cherrycoke says that
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“History is not Chronology” nor “a Chain of single Links,” he echoes Benjamin’s
opposition to history as a “progression through homogenous, empty time,” a “Universal
history” that only “musters a mass of data to fill that homogeneous, empty time”
(“Theses” 261-262). Indeed, Cherrycoke’s alternative philosophy—that history is not “a
Chain of single Links…[but] rather, a great disorderly Tangle of Lines, long and short,
weak and strong, vanishing into the Mnemonick Deep, with only their Destination in
common”—strongly suggests Benjamin’s “Angel of History”: “Where we perceive a
chain of events, he [the Angel] sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage
upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet” (“Theses” 257).
Both Cherrycoke and Benjamin share this image of history: a “common
Destination”/ “Event”/ “single catastrophe” that engenders a “disorderly Tangle of lines”/
a “piling [of] wreckage upon wreckage”/ a “pile of debris [growing] skyward.”
According to this image, time does not pass in any kind of orderly, linear fashion, but
rather accumulates, disrupting our conventional notions of “past” and “present” as
distinct and static categories. And Cherrycoke, like Benjamin, suggests that the historian,
faced with this knowledge of history, must carry out an essential task: to ensure “that
there may ever continue more than one life-line back into a Past we risk, each day, losing
our forebears in forever.” For Benjamin, this task is to “seize hold of a memory as it
flashes up at a moment of danger” or else “every image of the past that is not recognized
by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably” (“Theses”
255). Both emphasize a commitment the present must make to the past, whether in the
shape of “life-lines” cast out from our “now” to “our forebears” or “flashes” from the
past that we must “seize hold of.” Everything is subject to this commitment; Benjamin

50

argues that “nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost for history”
(“Theses” 254), just as Cherrycoke envisions the “disorderly Tangle of Lines” as
comprised of all lines “long and short, weak and strong.” And both identify the same risk,
should the historian fail in this task: for the past to be lost, irretrievably, and the present
diminished for it.
In addition, Cherrycoke (as well as the novel generally) and Benjamin share a
common politics, or, as I put it earlier, a common partisanship. Partisan to whom? In the
world of the novel, it is a commitment to the subjugated and marginalized, “the Black
servants, the Indian poor, the Irish runaways, the Chinese sailors, the overflow’d from the
mad Hospital, all unchosen Philadelphia” (759). All the victims of empire, and of capital:
to Benjamin they are “the oppressed” (“Theses” 257), for Pynchon a “Mobility that is to
be.” And history, far from being an impartial account existing within “empty,
homogenous time,” is a site of their struggle. So, to undertake the project of a
Benjaminian philosophy of history is to enter that struggle on the side of “all unchosen
Philadelphia” – or, to put it another way, to inhabit a significantly and necessarily
Marxian paradigm of emancipation.11
But again: how?
We must take a closer look at the text of the novel, as well as at Benjamin’s
philosophy of history. As Baucom has it, Benjamin’s “Theses” “outline the perception”
of an accumulative philosophy of history, while the Arcades Project “demonstrates the
method” (Specters 123). I have argued that the perception of the “Theses” is echoed in
these passages and tropes in Mason & Dixon, especially in the above passage from
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This is not to say that Pynchon is a Marxist – the question is irrelevant here.
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Cherrycoke. What of the method, then? How does Benjamin show us this philosophy of
history in action, and, perhaps more importantly, how does it appear in Mason & Dixon?
The Benjaminian “method” Baucom describes is only sketched out in the
“Theses”: to “seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger.” It is in the
Arcades Project that we find an expanded—and more complex—description of this
cryptic “flash” and how we must “seize hold” of it. First, consider the Angel of History
from the “Theses” and the “wreckage upon wreckage…the pile of debris” accumulating
at his feet. Benjamin’s method is to comb through this wreckage, this catastrophic
detritus, and then to construct from the “rags, the refuse” of history a “literary montage,”
of which the Arcades Project is an example (Arcades 460). The montage, in turn, is
constructed of “images” which are dialectical and historical in the sense that they destroy
the notion of a static past and present. Benjamin explains that
it is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its
light on what is past; rather, the image is that wherein what has been comes
together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words: image is
dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is purely
temporal, the relation of what has been to the now is dialectical: not temporal in
nature but figural <bildlich>. Only dialectical images are genuinely historical—
that is, not archaic—images (Arcades 463).
In “seizing hold of a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger,” then, we are
“constellating” the “what-has-been” with the “now,” and in doing so creating a dialectical
image that is “genuinely historical.” From these images, we construct the montage, or
“assemble large-scale constructions out of the smallest and most precisely cut
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components,” each of which contains within in “the crystal of the total event” (Benjamin
Arcades 461).
An example is in order. One of Baucom’s main projects in Specters of the Atlantic
is to identify the Zong massacre as precisely such a Benjaminian image. It does not
merely shed light on the present or past, but is a “catastrophically exemplary event…in
which a total event becomes retrospectively and proleptically visible” (Baucom Specters
167). That total event is “the arrival…of the contemporary,” by which he means
a long twentieth century underwritten by the development of an Atlantic cycle of
capital accumulation: a cycle of capital dominated at either end of its 250-year
history by the stock, credit, insurance, and other money forms of finance capital;
headquartered in the spaces-of-flow of an archipelago of circum-Atlantic port
cities.
The Zong “event”—or more specifically, the murder of one hundred thirty-two slaves
thrown overboard, the ensuing insurance trial, and the petition of abolitionists to charge
the captain with murder—draws together two historical moments dominated by the logic
of finance capital: the moment in which the event occurred (what-has-been) and our own
nonsynchronously contemporary moment of speculative finance capital (now).
I’ll return to this example, because it is important to my argument and not chosen
arbitrarily. For now, we must determine how—or if—Mason & Dixon proposes or
reproduces a Benjaminian philosophy of history, beyond simply approaching or echoing
it in the discourses of the characters. In order to do so, we must look for these images,
these constellations of the what-has-been and the now; we must look for traces of time
that does not pass, but accumulates.
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And there is an obvious path for us to follow in this investigation. After all,
Mason & Dixon, if it is anything, is a thoroughly haunted novel—although how this
haunting occurs is complex. Punday argues that “ghostly presences” in Pynchon’s earlier
work—V., The Crying of Lot 49, and especially Gravity’s Rainbow—help develop
themes of “alternatives to official accounts of history and what we take to be the
everyday world” (251). In this sense, the ghosts of Mason & Dixon function similarly,
and help to advance what McHale identifies as the novel’s historiographic-metafictional
task.
But there is more. Aside from subverting historical verisimilitude, Mason &
Dixon’s ghosts also force us to think critically about the history of empire, colonization,
and, perhaps not surprisingly, historical time. Earlier I cited the novel’s commitment to
“wounds bodily and ghostly, great and small, [that] go aching on, not ev’ry one
commemorated,— nor, too often, even recounted” (6). What “ghostly wounds” are these?
They represent more than a single “wrong unrighted” as “Men of Reason will define a
Ghost” (68). Rather, Mason & Dixon is a novel haunted by a “Collective Ghost”: “the
Wrongs committed Daily against the Slaves, petty and grave ones alike, going
unrecorded, charm’d invisible to history, invisible yet possessing Mass, and Velocity,
able not only to rattle Chains but to break them as well” (68). These ghosts are historical
and systematic; they are not the product of some personal injustice but of a world-system
that is fundamentally unjust.
Punday, citing this same passage, says that “we are invited to expect a story
whose real hauntings involve the ‘Collective Ghost’…[and yet] such collective wrongs
do not…directly provide the novel’s ghosts” (271). He argues that Rebekah is a model of
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a new turn in Pynchon’s work with respect to ghostliness, and that she, like the ghosts of
Derrida’s Specters of Marx, are “not emblems of the past, but things always imagined out
of the present and projected into the future as part of an ethical task” (Punday 259).
Punday is on to something here, but I find his conclusion problematic for two reasons.
One, his focus is limited to Rebekah and the Ghastly Fop, and although they do (perhaps)
seem to conform to his argument that the ghosts of Mason & Dixon are not directly
bound up with the systemic/historical “Collective Ghost,” they are far from the only
ghosts in the novel. And two, his claim that the novel’s ghosts are “always imagined out
of the present and projected into the future” and not “emblems of the past” fails to do
justice to the historical task that I believe Mason & Dixon sets out to do.
Putting Rebekah aside for the moment, let us consider the other ghosts of the
novel. Most are unambiguously presented as the victims of empire, whether in Europe,
Africa, or the Americas; no doubt elements of the “Collective Ghost.” The
aforementioned passage comes from Mason and Dixon’s time in Cape Town, which
Mason regards as “one of the colonies of Hell, with the Dutch Company acting as but a
sort of Caretaker for another…Embodying of Power” (71, ellipsis in original). This other
“Embodying of Power” can be understood as European imperialism, or, really, the
tyranny of capital logic executed by imperial powers. This “Power” in turn engenders
“the great Worm of Slavery” that is “coiled behind all” Mason and Dixon encounter in
Cape Town (147). As Dixon realizes upon his return to Cape Town, there are “ghosts
ev’rywhere” haunting “these shores exactly to the Atom” (155). Slavery haunts this
place, as it haunts them, a record not only of past wrongs but “Wrongs committed Daily
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against the Slaves”—a “Collective Ghost” that embodies both the what-has-been and the
now.
The surveyors go to St. Helena, and there, it is the same. Maskelyne, although “a
dangerously insane person” (128), recognizes that the island is haunted: “this place! this
great Ruin,— haunted…an Obstinate Spectre,— an ancient Crime,— none here will ever
escape it” (132 ellipsis in original). The “Crime” of colonization and slavery, perhaps not
precisely what Maskelyne intends in his ravings, creates an aura of ghostliness about the
island, an atmosphere in which actual ghosts (Rebekah and, perhaps, Dieter as well)
materialize.
America is also haunted by the “Collective Ghost,” these victims of empire.
Before even arriving, Mason and Dixon recognize the imperial project at work in British
North America: “’tis said these people keep slaves, as did our late Hosts [the Cape Dutch]
,— that they are likewise inclin’d to kill the People already living where they wish to
settle” (248). And, as in Cape Town, as in St. Helena, they experience the ghostliness of
this colonized space directly. In Lancaster Town, “the place where was perpetrated last
Winter the Horrid and inhuman murder of 26 Indians, Men, Women and Children,
leaving none alive to tell” (341), Mason and Dixon separately visit the site of the
massacre. Viewing the “soil’d and strewn Courtyard where it happen’d,” Mason
encounters the “metaphysickal Remnants of Evil,” which leaves him feeling “like a Nun
before a Shrine” (346). Dixon is similarly overwhelmed, but he is struck by the physical
reminders: he “sees where blows with Rifle-Butts miss’d their Marks, and chipp’d the
Walls,” and “blood in Corners never cleans’d” (347). This site is a space of time
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accumulating, manifested physically on the walls, interpreted metaphysically by Mason,
a space haunted by an event singularly horrific and systemically/historically typical.
It is not the only massacre site the surveyors witness. Crossing the
Conococheague River, they encounter a “burn’d and bloodied little huddle of Cabins”
and choose not to linger there, “among these Ghosts” (499). Later, they enter the “strewn
and charr’d Theater of the late War [the French and Indian War], where Indians are still
being shot by white men, and whites scalp’d by Indians” (614). Three men in the
surveying party, “veterans of Braddock’s Defeat, depress the Spirits of the Company with
Tales of that Tragedy, of how the Bears came out of the Trees to feed upon the Corpses
of English solders, ‘A Defile of Ghosts growing, with the Years, more desperate and
savage, to Settlers and Indians alike’ ” (614). Ghostliness, here, is not a simple matter of
the past coming back to haunt the present, it is a condition in which the what-has-been
comes together with the now to form a haunting constellation. The ghosts of the English
soldiers are not objects of the past, but subjects in the present, “growing, with the Years,
more desperate and savage” in a way that parallels the continuing violent aftermath of the
French and Indian War.
Further examples are numerous. In Ireland, another colonized space, Mason has
an additional ghostly experience: traveling with people who “might be a Herd of Ghosts,
felt but invisible, bearing him into Country Unknown” to help repair a peat bog during a
storm (724). Although not literally ghosts, his Irish companions are associated with the
ghostly, and with all the connections the novel works to establish between haunting,
colonization, and accumulative time.
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But what to make of Rebekah, surely the most prominent ghost in the novel?
Punday argues that she is unlike the “Collective Ghost,” which can only be understood
from the “vertical” perspective of history. Rather, she represents a “horizontal ghostliness
based on expectation rather than closure, individual rather than culturally symptomatic”
(Punday 265). Here, Punday is drawing on Brian McHale’s argument that Mason &
Dixon signals a turn from the “vertical” perspective of Pynchon’s earlier work, especially
Gravity’s Rainbow, to a more “horizontal” perspective (consider the rocket’s parabola in
Gravity’s Rainbow versus the mapping of the line in Mason & Dixon). Rebekah, then, is
important not in that she represents some claim the past has on the present, or a debt to
the past that needs settling, but because she enacts a “far smaller, far more personal
haunting” (Punday 271). She does not come “with demands for Mason; she is, instead, a
figure of waiting and expectation to which he is connected and for which he is ultimately
responsible.” The end result, according to Punday, is a vague notion of “responsible
involvement” which “offers a fundamentally different image of the work of mourning
and our responsibility to the dead” (273). Rebekah, then, does not fit with the ghosts of
slaves rattling their chains, Indians massacred in huddled courtyards, or soldiers eaten by
bears, because she is associated only with Mason’s personal responsibility toward her,
and not with some broader, systemic/historical, “Collective” injustice.
Or is she? There is one striking detail that draws Rebekah back into the sphere of
the “Collective Ghost,” something that links her to the “ghostly wounds” of the past.
Throughout the novel, Dixon typically comments on the many injustices the surveyors
find across the circum-Atlantic world while Mason stays silent – with one exception.
Mason recalls that “in ‘fifty-six the Justices of the Peace, upon easily imagin’d
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arrangements with the Clothiers, reduced by half the Wages set by law” (501), thus
provoking a weaver’s strike that was brutally repressed by British troops. With “a
submerriment Dixon recognizes,” Mason describes the uprising, and “the Murmur,—
ever, unceasingly, the great, crisp, serene Roar,— of a Mobility focus’d upon a just
purpose” (502). Yet immediately before describing the scene, “he pauses as if reaching a
small decision,” and says, “Rebekah’s people were weavers.” In fact, “that wondrous
night, in the High Street, they were all there, brothers, and cousins and uncles…I [Mason]
was there.”
Mason’s connection to the uprising is personal, for the “Mobility” that took to the
streets was comprised not of strangers, but (partially) of “Rebekah’s people”—as well as
Mason himself, who witnessed the uprising although he did not directly participate. And
this uprising, which Mason on some level associates with Rebekah, is but one event in
the larger history of early English capitalism, the injustices of which haunt Mason
throughout the novel. He describes how upon his “home soil, the Ground for growing any
such Wonders [as Dixon may have seen in the North] has been cruelly poison’d, with the
coming of the hydraulick Looms and the appearance of new sorts of wealthy individual,
the late-come rulers upon whom as a younger person [he] spied, silent, whilst holding
savage feelings within” (313). This is a rare moment for Mason, who usually refrains
from such overtly critical—and even rebellious—comments. Like a Romantic poet, he
feels as though he has been “expell’d from Paradise” by the consolidation of early
capitalist production in England.
The weavers’ uprising, then, is a moment of resistance that Mason can celebrate,
while he is at the same time forced to mourn its violent suppression. Thus, when he
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pauses before describing the uprising to Dixon, “as if reaching a small decision,” he
seems to be accepting some kind of connection between the seemingly disparate ghosts
that haunt him: the trauma of early capitalism and Rebekah. This is not to say that
Rebekah’s ghost is a symbol for the injustice committed against the weavers, but that
hers is not the completely individual, “far more personal” haunting Punday suggests. As
Mason sees her, she is to an extent bound up in the claims of the “Collective Ghost,” and
thus Mason’s melancholy is, perhaps, not the entirely personal affliction it seems.
The ghostliness of Mason & Dixon is only one way the novel represents a time
that does not simply pass, but accumulates. We also see this project at work in the text’s
decidedly Benjaminian treatment of commodities. As Baucom notes, Benjamin’s Arcades
Project, generally speaking, exemplifies a philosophy of history that regards time as
accumulative, not empty and homogenous. Specifically, Benjamin sets out “to recover
the time accumulated within the commodities accumulated for display in the Parisian
temples of commodity culture: the World Exhibitions, Haussman’s consumer-friendly
boulevards, the arcades” (Baucom Specters 24). This project, Baucom explains, must
above all recognize that
time accumulates in things, even, or particularly, those commodified things whose
commodification entails not only the assignation of an exchange value but the
willed repudiation of the time stored within them, the denial of their capacity to
function as Proustian aide-mémoire, Marxian record keepers of the time it took to
make them, the value of the labor time, the collective past-life it encodes
(Specters 24).
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Mason & Dixon, in addition to its use of hauntings, also works to show us that “time
accumulates in things” and actively repudiates the “willed repudiation of the time stored
within” commodities.
For instance, while in America Mason and Dixon enter a tavern to find its
occupants crazy for, among other things, sugar. It is “to be found at every hand in lucent
brown cones great and little, Ic’d Cupcakes by the platter-ful, all manner of punches and
flips, pies of the locality, crullers, muffins, and custards”; a seemingly pleasant
smorgasbord indeed (329). We are quickly reminded, however, that there is “no table that
does not hold some sweet memento, for those it matters to, of the cane thickets, the
chains, the cruel Sugar-Islands.” The time accumulating within these various sugarcommodities—the time it took to make them, the conditions under which they were
produced, and the barbarism of that production—is revealed, and the picture is grim. As a
“Quaker gentleman of Philadelphia” reminds the room, the sugar-commodity is a
“sweetness of immorality and corruption…bought as it is with the lives of African slaves,
untallied black lives broken upon the greedy engines of the Barbadoes.” The injustices of
the slave system and the moments of despair and cruelty experienced by the people held
in its clutches accumulate and crystallize in these commodities; each cone of sugar
represents “untallied black lives” consumed by the engine of Atlantic production.
We see this same effort to reveal the time accumulated within commodities in a
later scene involving Mr. LeSpark and Cherrycoke. LeSpark, who “made his Fortune
years before the War, selling weapons to French and British, Settlers and Indians alike”
(31), recalls being drawn to and inspired by an iron forge he would regularly visit. Even
though “few distinguish between the Metal itself, and the Forms it happens to end up in”
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(weapons, knives, and other instruments of violence), LeSpark treats the “blinding
purity” of the forge and the molten metal as something to celebrate, if not worship (412).
But Cherrycoke later criticizes LeSpark in his own journal, writing: “What is not visible
in his rendering…is the Negro Slavery, that goes on making such no doubt exquisite
moments possible.” Like the sugar-commodities, the production in the forge, and in turn
the various iron-commodities produced there, are all “Marxian record keepers” of the
time accumulated within them. Cherrycoke cannot contemplate this production without
also seeing “the unpric’d Coercion necessary to yearly Profits beyond the projectings
even of proud Satan.” Just as, in Benjamin’s phrase, there is “no document of civilization
which is not at the same time a document of barbarism” (“Theses” 256), there is no
sugary pastry or iron tool which is not stamped with the injustice of its production, “these
undeclared secular terms in the Equations of Proprietary Happiness” (412).
These examples—the hauntings, the commodities—show us how Mason & Dixon
works to advance a Benjaminian philosophy of history. And yet they are decidedly
limited in their scope. When Mason encounters a haunted massacre site, or when we are
presented with pies that carry traces of the slave labor required to produce them, we are, I
have been arguing, seeing a time that accumulates. But the “now” and the “what-hasbeen” that come into constellation with each other in these examples are specifically the
“now” of the narrative moment—the late eighteenth century—and the various “what-hasbeens” that precede it. As we know, there is nothing secure about the “now” of the
narrative moment: recall the “barrage of anachronisms…[that] corrupts the facts and
disrupts the whole retelling of history,” the perplexing frequency with which Pynchon
subverts the historical verisimilitude of his narrative. Although these dislocations might
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suggest that the Benjaminian “flashes” I believe to be crucial to Mason & Dixon’s
historical project are hopelessly corrupted, I argue that, on the contrary, the deliberate
anachronisms work to expand the scope of the novel, to allow us to constellate the “whathas-been” not only with the “now” of the narrative moment, but also with our own.
First, we should examine a few of these anachronisms. Mason meets a young girl
in New York who, discussing her preference for dressing entirely in black, says, “Oh,
aye, at home they’re on at me about it without Mercy…I’m, as, ‘But I like Black,’—yet
my Uncle, he’s, as, ‘Strangers will take you for I don’t know what’” (400). As McHale
puts it, “substitute ‘like’ for Amy’s ‘as’ (“I’m, like, ‘But I like Black”) and you have a
1990s adolescent, thinly disguised as an eighteenth-century milkmaid” (47). Dixon
encounters a rabbi whose salute takes the form of “Fingers spread two and two, and the
Thumb held away from them likewise,” signifying “Live long and prosper”— no doubt a
reference to Star Trek’s Dr. Spock (485). He later meets a “somehow nautical-looking
Indiv. with gigantick Fore-Arms, and one Eye ever a-Squint from the Smoke of his Pipe”
who “helpfully translates” the Hebrew Eyeh asher Eyeh as “I am that which I am”—none
other than the cartoon character Popeye the sailor-man (486).
Figures from American history receive a similarly anachronistic treatment. Ben
Franklin sports “tinted lenses of Spectacles of his own Invention, for moderating the
Glare of the Sun” (266), offers a parody of one of his famous maxims (“Strangers, heed
my wise advice,— Never pay the Retail Price”) (267), and appears to have groupies (271)
as well as a “gnomelike” assistant named Ingvarr who cries, “Master! Master!” (764);
George Washington smokes marijuana with the surveyors, condescendingly summons his
“African servant” with, “Gershom! Where be you at, my man!” (278), and encourages his
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servant to tell “King-Joaks” like a stand-up comedian (284); and Thomas Jefferson,
hearing Dixon toast “To the pursuit of Happiness,” asks if he can “use the Phrase
sometime” (395). Additionally, Cherrycoke meets a man who seems to be using a
thermos (356), the surveyors find themselves in the infamous “Delaware Triangle” (323),
Zhang describes “Sha, or, as they say in Spanish California, Bad Energy” (542), and
Ethelmer, explaining the new “Revolutionary” music, relates it to “the Clamor of the
Mills, the Rock of the Oceans, the Roll of the Drums in the Night [my emphasis],” which
the Twins label “Surf Music!” (264).
While these examples involve the insertion of twentieth-century references into
the plot or dialogue, we also find Pynchon playing with the eighteenth-century narrative
style he adopts in a conspicuously self-reflexive way. For instance, a defensive Mason
uses the phrase “Inexpensive Salvo” (a “cheap shot”) (302), and later, annoyed with his
family’s insistence that he re-marry, thinks he hears, “from the direction of St. Kenelm’s
church-yard, a certain subterranean Rotation” (Rebekah “turning in her grave”) (200).
Pynchon even recycles an old joke involving name sequence, which draws our attention
to the novel as a novel itself as well as our contemporary familiarity with the term
“Mason-Dixon”: Professor Voam, meeting the pair for the first time, exclaims, “Of
course! The Astronomers! Dixon and Mason!” to which Mason responds,
“Actually…That’s—” (426).
As McHale argues, these anachronisms certainly “invite critical scrutiny of the
epistemological bases of historical reconstruction,” and in doing so, contribute to the
novel’s status as historiographic metafiction. But they also reorient the temporal scope of
the text beyond the narrative moment of the late eighteenth century, and reconnect it with
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a different moment, that of the late twentieth century. In other words, Pynchon’s use of
deliberate anachronism does not just subvert historical verisimilitude but forcefully, even
jarringly, reminds us that this is a novel produced in the 1990s pretending to be a novel
produced in the 1790s. While he scrupulously reproduces eighteenth-century narrative
conventions, Pynchon simultaneously imposes what is clearly his twentieth-century
perspective. The result is a novel in which there are two levels of “now” constellated with
an array of “what-has-been.” We have the first level, the “now” of the narrative moment
which constellates itself with “what-has-been” in the ways I have described. And we have
the second level, the “now” of the late twentieth century, the moment in which Pynchon
is writing, which constellates itself with a “what-has-been” that includes the late
eighteenth century, the first level of “now.”12
It is at this second level of “now” that Mason & Dixon’s Benjaminian philosophy
of history is most apparent and most powerful – and most relevant to our project. There is
a definite significance to the periods Pynchon is effectively constellating, the late
eighteenth and late twentieth centuries. Recall Baucom’s argument, drawing on Arrighi’s
exploration of cycles of capital accumulation. Both the late eighteenth and late twentieth
centuries are moments in which finance capital represents the dominant form of capital
accumulation, “crucial periods in which finance capital exerts its dominance over an
ever-expanding capital world system” (Baucom Specters 27). In other words, the
dominant form of accumulation is tied not to commodity production, but to capital that
12

For the purposes of my argument, I have organized the novel into these two levels of “now.” Things are a
bit more complicated, however, and it is worth pointing out that the first level of “now” is actually
comprised of two levels itself. The “now” of the narrative moment, which I broadly understand as the late
eighteenth century, is really split into the post-Independence 1780s in which Cherrycoke is narrating the
story, and the pre-Independence 1760s in which Mason and Dixon travel the circum-Atlantic world with
Cherrycoke as an occasional companion. My designation of the two “nows” is meant to correspond with
the beginning and ending stages of Baucom’s Atlantic cycle of capital accumulation.
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“seems to turn its back entirely on the thingly world, sets itself free from the material
constraints of production and distribution, and revels in its pure capacity to breed money
from money—as if by a sublime trick of the imagination” (Baucom Specters 27).
During these moments of rampant speculation, Arrighi argues, the cycle of
accumulation tends to shift from one theater to another: from a Genoese to a Dutch to a
British to an American cycle (thus far). For Baucom, however, these last two cycles—
British and American—can better be understood as a single Atlantic cycle, or a long
twentieth century. He argues there is
no such thing as a fully discrete or isolated ‘present’ or ‘past,’ just as there is no
discrete late twentieth century or early twenty-first to speak of, only a
nonsynchronous contemporaneity in which an older deep-structural form
inscribes, reasserts, and finds itself realized: an ordinately long twentieth century
boundaried at either end by one of Arrighi’s transitional periods of pure money
capital (Baucom Specters 30).
The “bookends” of the Atlantic cycle, then, are the same as the two levels of “now”
present in Mason & Dixon; the two moments of M-M΄ that usher in and mark the decline
of the Atlantic cycle are the very same moments that are put into constellation with one
another by the novel. I will not argue that Mason & Dixon can be understood in the same
way that Baucom understands the Zong massacre, as a “truth-event” which reveals
(especially through its insurance protocols) the epistemological foundation of our
contemporary moment of global finance capital. But I believe that Mason & Dixon, by
drawing these particular moments into constellation with one another, does, like the
Zong, demand a Benjaminian philosophy of history, a notion of time that does not pass,
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but accumulates. And, in particular, it advances this philosophy of history as a mode of
understanding the Atlantic cycle of accumulation, as a period in the history of capitalism
that draws together our late twentieth century and the late eighteenth, in which the latter
is accumulated and intensified within the former. As Benjamin would have it, Mason &
Dixon is, like the Zong massacre for Baucom, full of images in which “truth is charged to
the bursting point with time,” where “what has been comes together in a flash with the
now to form a constellation” (Arcades 463).
This project is at work throughout the entirety of the novel. But there are specific
moments when, I believe, we can most clearly see Mason & Dixon’s Benjaminian
philosophy of history as the text constructs these temporal constellations.
In Cape Town, Mason and Dixon lodge with Cornelius Vroom, a slave-owning
Cape Dutch settler who is the veritable embodiment of colonialist paranoia. He, along
with the rest of the Cape Dutch, does not trust Dixon, after noting the surveyor’s
“unconceal’d attraction to the Malays and the Black slaves,— their Food, their
Appearance, their Music, and so, it must be obvious, their desires to be deliver’d out of
oppression” (61). Mason and Dixon have encountered this kind of paranoia before: upon
their arrival, they are met by “Police Official Bonk” who insinuates that their
astronomical mission, to observe the transit of Venus, is but “a pretext” to observe
something “more Worldly,— Our Fortifications, Our Slaves” (59). It is hard not to read
this Cape Town as a kind of police-state, mired in suspicion over subversive elements
who threaten to disrupt or oppose the slave system; that is, it is hard not to read this Cape
Town through our contemporary knowledge of apartheid South Africa. This is not to say
that the 1761 Cape Town Mason and Dixon visit is merely a symbol for twentieth-
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century apartheid; the oppression they witness there is no less real and no less significant
than later forms. In reading this scene, however, we are forced to draw the parallel and
recognize that the Cape Town of 1761 is not the object of some isolated past, but exists in
constellation with a later “now.”
This effect is more pronounced in another passage. Cornelius, “Deep in the
curfew hours, in bed with his pipe,” contemplates the state of the Dutch colony. He is
kept awake by what he imagines to be the laughter of slaves, watching, waiting.
Somewhat as his Neighbors each strenuous Sunday profess belief in the Great
Struggle at the End of the World, so does Cornelius, inside his perimeter of
Mauritian smoke at the hour when nothing is lawfully a-stir but the Rattle-Watch
and the wind, find in his anxious meditations no Release from the coming
Armageddon of the races,— this European settlement so precarious, facing an
unknown Interior with the sea at their backs, forced, step after step, by the
steadfast Gravity of all Africa, down into it at last…. It is another way of living
where the Sea is ever higher than one’s Head, and kept out only provisionally
(63).
Cornelius is like a microcosm of the entire colony, “inside his perimeter” of smoke,
awaiting the day when the entire project is pushed into the sea. This passage is cryptic
and ominous, much as such thoughts would have appeared to Cornelius in 1761. But we,
from our later perspective, understand its significance. The “European settlement” and
indeed all formal European colonialism did in fact find itself locked in battle with the
“steadfast Gravity of all Africa”— multiple forces of resistance that culminated in the
national liberation struggles of the twentieth century, the ANC in South Africa being,
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perhaps, one of the most well-known. And these struggles were successful in pushing
formal colonialism “down into [the sea] at last” (even if only to be subject to continued
neocolonial exploitation). In 1761, would Cornelius have thought of the settlement,
indeed European colonialism in Africa generally, as “living where the Sea is ever higher
than one’s Head, and kept out only provisionally”? Perhaps. We, encountering this text
from our own postcolonial moment, would certainly read the settlement this way,
knowing that what Cornelius envisions as “the coming Armageddon of the races” and
what we recall as successful anticolonial liberation struggles made the situation only
“provisional.”
Our reading of this passage, then, creates a disruption of “past” and “present” as
discrete categories. Cornelius’s thoughts, specific as they are to his historical moment,
are also highly significant to our own, and in this way, these images of “what-has-been”
are constellated with our “now.” Yet because this example involves a retrospective
perspective (the “now” is our contemporary understanding of the past, and not
necessarily how we inhabit our present), this example may not be entirely adequate.
Mason & Dixon most clearly asserts its philosophy of history in its depictions of
the workings of global capitalism. On St. Helena, the soldiers have set up a kind of
gambling ring, with
various Suicide-Banks and Madness-Pools, into which one may put as little as a
six-pence…and thus convert this Wind into Cash, as others might convert it to a
Rotary Impulse upon a Mill-Stone. Fortunes certainly the equal of many a
Nabob’s are amass’d, risk’d, and lost within a Night. ‘We are the Doings of
Global Trade in miniature!’ cries the Post Surgeon, who tries never to stir too far
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from the deepest rooms of the Fort, where the Wind may oppress him least, and is
careful to include it in each daily Prayer, as if ‘twere a Deity it itself, infinitely in
Need, ever demanding.... (159).
The soldiers are essentially performing capital speculation, or, as the Post Surgeon puts it,
“the Doings of Global Trade in miniature.” Instead of using the “Wind”—or, the chaotic
forces of the market—to turn a “Mill-Stone” and engage in commodity production, they
“convert this Wind into Cash” directly, generating immense sums “equal of many a
Nabob’s,” breeding money from money, M-M΄, “—as if by a sublime trick of the
imagination.” It is fair depiction of the late eighteenth century, a moment dominated by
finance capital, just as it is a fair depiction of the late twentieth century, a moment of
dominant finance capital that inherits and intensifies the previous shift to M-M΄, the late
eighteenth century accumulating within it. From our perspective, we can see that the Post
Surgeon, daily praying to the wind “as if ‘twere a Deity in itself, infinitely in Need,”
echoes the twentieth century doctrine of neoliberalism, an ideology that regards the
market as nothing less than a deity, insatiable in its demands. He mimics the behavior of
most of neoliberalism’s ruling-class adherents: he keeps as far away from the violence of
unchecked market forces as possible, in “the deepest rooms of the Fort, where the Wind
may oppress him least.” We can also read the soldiers as traders on the floor of the Stock
Exchange, where fortunes are “amass’d, risk’d, and lost” within a single trading session.
Later, on the eve of their voyage to America, Dixon points out that “ev’ry
Observation site propos’d by the Royal Society prov’d to be a Factory, or Consulate, or
other Agency of some royally Charter’d Company” (252). Mason then concludes that
“Charter’d Companies may indeed be the form the World has increasingly begun to
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take.” From their 1763 perspective, this appears to be the case: Dixon correctly states that
every place they are sent to is somehow connected to a chartered company, and Mason
adds that “both Pennsylvania and Maryland are Charter’d Companies as well, if it comes
to that.” From our perspective, however, we know that this is the case, that “Charter’d
Companies”—or, for the sake of this argument, the form they have assumed under
twentieth-century capitalism, the modern business corporation—have become the
dominant actors of late capitalism. Thus these images, of soldiers on St. Helena
performing the accumulation of finance capital and of a world becoming dominated by
corporations, are precisely the kind of dialectical, Benjaminian “flash” images in which
we see a time that accumulates. They do not simply show two historical moments that are
“like” each other, but two moments that are inextricably bound up in each other; they
depict one M-M΄ phase of capital accumulation that does not only precedes but
accumulates and intensifies within another. We are able to read these passages and roll
our eyes (or perhaps sigh despondently) because we can recognize these moments as
nonsynchronously contemporaneous—not in any arbitrary sense, but in the way they are
linked via the particular phase of capital accumulation that determines them.
But there is more to this project than simply demonstrating the links between two
moments of dominant finance capital, or, really, portraying them in such a way that they
“come together in a flash to form a constellation.” As I noted earlier, a Benjaminian
philosophy of history is decidedly partisan—or, to be more specific, anti-capitalist.
Mason & Dixon adopts this project in a variety of ways, but particularly in how it depicts
global capitalism and the condition of those who labor under the rule of capital. The
above examples lay out the novel’s understanding of finance capital, but do not engage in
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any pointed critique of capitalist accumulation. This is not the case, however, with other
passages. Keeping in mind what we have established thus far in terms of the novel’s
philosophy of history, we are faced with some important questions: how does the
exploitative nature of capitalism change over time, if time is something that accumulates?
And what is the relationship between different forms of labor under different stages of
historical capitalism?
Or, what does it mean to be a slave?
The specter of slavery haunts the entire novel. At the end of their journey, Dixon
asks Mason “what’s the Element common to all” their destinations—“the Cape, St.
Helena, America” (692). He provides the answer himself:
Slaves. Ev’ry day at the Cape, we lived with Slavery in our faces,— more of it at
St. Helena,— and now here we are again, in another Colony, this time having
drawn them a Line between their Slave-Keepers, and their Wage-Payers, as if
doom’d to re-encounter thro’ the World this public secret, this shameful Core....
Pretending it to be ever somewhere else…down there, down where it smells like
warm Brine and Gunpowder fumes, they’re murdering and dispossessing
thousands untallied, the innocent of the World, passing daily into the Hands of
Slave-owners and Torturers, but oh, never in Holland, nor in England, that Garden
of Fools… Where does it end? No matter where in it we go, shall we find all the
World Tyrants and Slaves? (693).
Where does it end, indeed. Or perhaps a better question is, when does it end? What does
it mean for the novel to discuss slavery, if the narrative moment in which Dixon speaks is
not part of some isolated past, but a “what-has-been” in constellation with our “now”?
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Dixon sets up this division: on one side of the Line, there are “Slave-Keepers”
and on the other, “Wage-Payers.” He implies that there is a difference (and of course,
there is), but he also creates a parallel between the two. Importantly, he does not say
“slaves” and “waged workers,” but instead focuses on the bosses, making a distinction
only between those who own their workers as chattel and those who pay a wage for the
labor-power of their workers. Importantly, the workers themselves—regardless of their
condition of servitude—are referred to as “Slaves.” Does Dixon just mean chattel slaves,
workers who are enslaved in the legal sense? Perhaps. It is more likely, however, that he
is using “slavery” to refer both to chattel and wage slavery, to multiple forms of
economic exploitation. His language, after all, is extremely broad: all the “World [is]
Tyrants and Slaves.” And it is precisely this kind of hierarchical pattern of class
domination and coerced labor that they are “doom’d to re-encounter thro’ the World” as a
“public secret, this shameful Core.” In one sense, then, the “shameful Core” is the slave
system that provided the foundation for an Atlantic cycle of accumulation and European
colonization of the Americas. But it is also more than that; it is a fundamental injustice
that we are “doom’d to re-encounter” over space and through time, in the narrative
moment of the text and in our own nonsynchronously contemporary moment: the
“shameful Core” is the very heart of our long twentieth century.
As we have seen in other passages, Dixon’s comments take on a new significance
when we read them from our later perspective, knowing that we are supposed to be aware
of this later perspective. But to argue that the novel’s understanding of slavery includes
all coerced labor, waged and chattel – is this too forceful a reading? The narrator
(presumably Cherrycoke) removes all doubt: “Commerce without Slavery is unthinkable,
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whilst Slavery must ever include, as an essential Term, the Gallows,— Slavery without
the Gallows being as hollow and Waste a Proceeding, as a Crusade without the Cross”
(108). Commerce, to slavery, to the gallows: there is an essential unity between
commerce and slavery, and to somehow wrench them apart is “unthinkable.” What is
common to both is death: the threat of the gallows for chattel slaves who choose to resist
their enslavement, and the threat of starvation for waged workers who do not or cannot
work (or again the gallows for those who resist their exploitation). What this passage
implies is that to imagine the late twentieth century—surely dominated by commerce and
mired in death—as free of slavery is also “unthinkable.” Pynchon is not thinking of
chattel slavery in the 1990s, of course, but of wage slavery as the new form assumed by
our “World of Tyrants and Slaves.”
We find the relationship between wage labor and slavery discussed elsewhere in
the novel. In New York, Mason meets an underground cell of the Sons of Liberty, who
immediately begin to question Mason’s “free” status. Because he owns no property,
Mason asserts that the British parliament is not “his” parliament—to which one of the
Sons responds, “Then you’re a Serf. As they call it here, a Slave…Someone owns you,
Sir. He pays for your Meals and Lodging. He lends you out to others. What is that call’d,
where you come from?” (406). When Mason protests, the Sons push him, explaining that
he should know “Degrees of Slavery,” being from Stroud and familiar with the plight of
British weavers. Although weavers are paid, as Mason argues, the Captain reminds him
of “how Weavers are paid,— tho’ Wofle preferr’d to settle the Pay-list with lead and
steel…thinking he’d use weavers for target practice” (407). The Captain explains that
“when Weavers try to remedy the inequality by forming Associations, the Clothiers bring
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in Infantry, to kill, disable, or deliver up to Transportation any who be troublesome.” He
echoes Dixon’s categories of “Slave-Keepers” and “Wage-Payers,” arguing that the latter
employ Dragoons who “prefer rifle-butts to whips,— the two hurt differently,— what
otherwise is the difference in the two forms of Regulation?” To the Sons of Liberty—
and, I am arguing, to the novel—there is little qualitative difference between the
exploitation of British weavers and the exploitation of American chattel slaves, and that
both forms of coerced labor are not free or unfree opposites but represent “Degrees of
Slavery.”
What should we make, then, of the Line itself, a key element of the novel whose
purpose, at least historically, was to mark the boundary between “Slave-Keepers” and
“Wage Payers”? Although Mason believes the two provinces are “alike as Stacy and
Tracy” (615), Dixon, ever more attuned to injustice, disagrees, pointing out “the Negro
Slavery upon one side…and not the other.” But Zhang interrupts, saying, “If you think
you see no Slaves in Pennsylvania…why, look again. They are not all African, nor do
some of them even yet know,— may never know,— that they are Slaves.” Again, our
understanding of slavery is expanded beyond the category of chattel slave to include the
territory of the “Wage-Payers.” Importantly, Zhang disrupts the notion of the Line as a
rational, organizing force; its bourgeois categorization of “slave” and “free” labor is
rejected for a more complex and critical understanding of oppression. This critique seems
to fit with Zhang’s previous opposition to the Line as a kind of authoritarian and
decidedly negative project: “to mark a right Line upon the Earth is to inflict upon the
Dragon’s very Flesh, a sword-slash, a long perfect scar, impossible for any who live out
here the year ‘round to see as other than hateful Assault” (542). Or, to mark the Line is to
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create a false division between different but fundamentally similar forms of oppression—
just as, in a way, to separate these passages from their contemporary significance, as anticapitalist critiques of the wage-labor system, is to create a similarly false division
between the “what-has-been” they depict and the “now” by which they are informed.
We have seen how Mason & Dixon promotes a Benjaminian philosophy of
history through the construction of such constellations. Various “what-have-beens” come
together with various “nows” in flashes, through ghostliness, commodities, and images of
exploitation. Time does not simply pass; it is not the “homogenous, empty” time of
capitalist modernity, but a time that accumulates, engendering a philosophy of history
that is, at its core, a project of counter-modernity. Or, as I asserted earlier, the project of
this novel, if not to “commemorate” or “even recount” the “ghostly wounds” of the past,
is to offer an alternative philosophy of history which seeks to do just that.
And this is a fundamentally Atlantic project. Mason & Dixon is not interested in
arbitrarily constellating temporal moments, but in those moments of dominant finance
capital that “bookend” the Atlantic cycle of capital accumulation. And, of course, it
charts a journey that is literally circum-Atlantic: from England to Cape Town to St.
Helena to America, with numerous diversions to other spaces caught up in the Atlantic
economic apparatus. The journey it charts is not only spatial—around and across the
Atlantic basin—but also temporal, in that the text works to constellate the beginning and
the end of the Atlantic cycle across time.
In this sense Mason & Dixon’s philosophy of history has as much in common
with the work of Édouard Glissant as it does with that of Walter Benjamin. Although
Glissant’s notion of accumulative time is very close to—and presumably rooted in—
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Benjamin’s, it nonetheless differs on one crucial point. Glissant’s Poetics of Relation,
like Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic, attempts to locate the origin of modernity in a
singularly traumatic and Atlantic moment: the African slave trade. From this moment
Glissant envisions the creation of a new kind of identity to counter modernist
universalism, an identity he calls Relation. “What took place in the Caribbean,” Glissant
argues, “which could be summed up in the word creolization, approximates the idea of
Relation for us as nearly as possible.” To be in Relation is to be in “a new and original
dimension” that allows “each person to be there and elsewhere, rooted and open, lost in
the mountains and free beneath the sea, in harmony and in errantry” (Glissant 34). And to
understand the world totality in terms of Relation, we must “approach it through the
accumulation of sediments,” a “poetics of duration” that does not—will not—let the past
simply pass (Glissant 33).
The difference between Glissant and Benjamin, while subtle, is important. As
Baucom puts it, the crucial distinction is between “Benjamin’s essential modernism and
Glissant’s thoroughgoing determination to articulate a counterdiscourse of modernity”
(Specters 319, italics in original). Benjamin’s “flash” is “recognizably universal in its
aspirations but contingent in its mode of realization…[it] might come at any time, in any
place, and it might illuminate any image of what-has-been.” Glissant’s sense of
accumulative time, however, is “recognizably global in its descriptive ambition but
particular in its historicizing range… [it is not] just an abstract measure of time endlessly
and indifferently adding up, but, rather, a modern order of time, the time of modernity:
which piles up from an exceptional historical catastrophe…the catastrophe of the Atlantic
abyss” (Baucom Specters 320).
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So while the accumulation of time in Mason & Dixon is undoubtedly
Benjaminian, it is also Glissantian, as it regards the time of modernity as accumulating
from an “exceptional historical catastrophe.” But what catastrophe is this? The Atlantic
slave trade is hardly the center of the novel, and we are certainly not given the intimately
harrowing perspective on the Middle Passage we find in Glissant’s Poetics of Relation.
Slavery is crucial to the novel’s depiction of the circum-Atlantic world, however—recall
that this is its “shameful Core.” It is the “shameful Core,” in fact, of what I perceive to be
the very catastrophe Pynchon locates at the source of his accumulating time, the “one
single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front” of
Benjamin’s Angel of History. The phrase Pynchon uses for this catastrophe, cryptic and
in desperate need of analysis, is: “the Day.”
In the novel, “the Day” (in the sense in which I am using it) appears infrequently
and functions subtly. In fact, it is easy to miss the significance of this phrase altogether.
Our biggest clue that “the Day” is even worth examining cannot be found in Mason &
Dixon, but rather in Pynchon’s subsequent novel, suggestively titled, Against the Day. It
seems that “the Day” is a Pynchonian trope introduced enigmatically in Mason & Dixon
and (perhaps) expanded upon in his later work.13 Consider these few references to “the
Day” in Mason & Dixon. When Eliza is captured by Indians, there is a breakdown of
13

It’s not my aim to offer a thorough analysis of “the Day” in Pynchon’s novel Against the Day. However,
we do see the phrase appear in the follow passage: “As nights went on and nothing happened and the
phenomenon slowly faded to the accustomed deeper violets again, most had difficulty remembering the
earlier rise of heart, the sense of overture and possibility, and went back once again to seeking only orgasm,
hallucination, stupor, sleep, to fetch them through the night and prepare them against the day” (805). This
image seems to correspond with my reading of how “the Day” functions in Mason & Dixon. We see similar
images throughout Against the Day, notably in an early scene when the Chums of Chance are drifting in
their balloon-ship over Chicago: “From this height it was as if the Chums, who, out on adventures past, had
often witnessed the vast herds of cattle adrift in ever-changing cloudlike patterns across the Western plains,
here saw that unshaped freedom being rationalized into movement only in straight lines and at right angles
and a progressive reduction of choices, until the final turn through the final gate that led to the killing floor”
(10).
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spatial and temporal stability: “for them to come to her, this far East of Susquehanna, this
far inside the perimeter of peaceable life, was for the Day to collapse into the past, into
darker times” (512). What is collapsing, “the Day,” is Eliza’s life as wife and mother in a
settler family, her safe position within the “perimeter” of the British colonial project in
North America. Also collapsing is the stability of the present as a category that is
distinctly and immutably “after” the past. Later, we find references to “the Day” as an
extractive and taxing force or institution: after a wedding, the feet of guests “rediscover
Steps that are their own, and not those of the Day and its Demands” (583); and
Cherrycoke recalls a night when he was particularly exhausted “from the Demands of the
Day, as part of the Tribute we must pay, merely to inhabit it” (649). Mason’s selfcomposed epitaph continues the pattern: “…Alas, ‘twas not so much the Years / As Day
by thieving Day,— / With Debts incurr’d, and Interest Due, / That Dreams were sold to
pay,—” (703).
These references suggest that “the Day” is somehow related to colonialism, to
stable and separate categories of “past” and “present,” and to forces of extraction. They
are illuminated, though, by what is probably the most important mention of “the Day,”
and is perhaps the source of the title of Pynchon’s next novel. As the surveyors venture
back eastward, out of Pynchon’s “subjunctive” West, they realize that
till the Moment they must pass over the Crest of the Savage Mountain, does there
remain to them, contrary to Reason, against the Day, a measurable chance, to
turn, to go back out of no more than Stubbornness, and somehow make all come
right…for, once over the Summit, they will belong again to the East, to
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Chesapeake,— and to Lords for whom Interests less subjunctive must ever enjoy
Priority (683, italics mine).
But they do not turn “against the Day” and continue West, toward the subjunctive, toward
possibility. Mason and Dixon venture back into “the Day,” into the colonial settlements
of the East: the world of “Reason” and “Interests less subjunctive”—a “thieving” world
with its own “Demands” that “we must pay, merely to inhabit it.” This is a world in
which people show their “devotion to the Day, and the Earth for whose sake something
far short of the sky must ever claim them, a stove, a child, a hen-house predator, a deep
upwind, the price of Corn, a thrown shoe, an early Freeze” (711). It is a world that
threatens to break down when the past interrupts—or invades—the stability of the
present. And at its “shameful Core” is a social order that reproduces itself in the form of
“Tyrants and Slaves.”
Thus, “the Day.” Or, as we might choose to identify it, capitalist modernity. “The
Day” is the trope around which Pynchon seems to organize his greatest critical targets:
modernity, capitalism, rationalism, the Enlightenment, progress, and hierarchies of
power. It is the catastrophe from which Mason & Dixon sees time accumulating, piling
up debris and wreckage upon wreckage in the light of its cold dawn. To move “against
the Day,” then, is to move against the current of all these forces of modernity, to enact a
project of counter-modernity that requires a different understanding of time and a
different philosophy of history, much like the projects of Benjamin and especially
Glissant. Why “especially” the latter? Because the dawning of “the Day” is not a
universal catastrophe, but a particular, historical, and Atlantic catastrophe.
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Cherrycoke asks that we imagine “that Mason and Dixon and their Line cross
Ohio after all, and continue West by the customary ten-minute increments” (706), a
journey through the subjunctive that he then begins to relate. Eventually, however, the
surveyors are forced back into “the Day” and they return to Delaware. What is next for
them? To “devise a way…to inscribe a Visto upon the Atlantick Sea,” Dixon suggests
(712). Mason goes on to describe a new Line “all the way from the Delaware Bay to the
Spanish Extremadura,” created through all the mechanisms of science and reason they
employed in carving the Visto westward through America. Once properly marked out, the
Line “shall have to be widen’d to a Sea-Road of a thousand Leagues, as up and down its
Longitude blossom Wharves, Chandleries, Inns, Tobacco-shops, Greengrocers’ Stalls,
Printers of News, Dens of Vice, Chapels for Repentance, Shops full of Souvenirs and
Sweets.” In other words, it will be a temple to capitalist consumption (not unlike
Benjamin’s arcades) where production—the labor necessary for the creation of all these
commodities—is entirely invisible. Then, after “the Land-Speculation Industry” gets
wind of this new oceanic space, it will become settled, and Mason and Dixon will retire
there, because “betwixt themselves, neither feels British enough anymore, nor quite
American, for either side of the Ocean…[they are] ever in a Ubiquity of Flow, before a
ceaseless Spectacle of Transition” (713).
These passages locate “the Day” in the Atlantic basin, as it pulls the forces of
European economic, political, territorial, and epistemological conquest together in a
single project of absorption and expansion that is literally founded upon the sea. It is
precisely a depiction of the Atlantic cycle of accumulation. And we find a similar image
in Mason’s deathbed vision:
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“ ‘Tis a Construction,” Mason weakly, “a great single Engine, the size of a
Continent. I have all the proofs you may require. Not all the Connexions are made
yet, that’s why some of it is still invisible. Day by day the Pioneers and Surveyors
go on, more points are being tied in, and soon becoming visible, as above, new
Stars are recorded and named and plac’d in Almanacks…” (772).
To revise my earlier statement, “the Day” is not simply capitalist modernity, but an
understanding of the modern as inextricably bound up with the Atlantic, as Baucom,
Glissant, and Gilroy argue. Yet while they tie modernity directly to the slave trade and
the Middle Passage (and specifically for Baucom, the Zong massacre), Pynchon envisions
something broader: the “great single Engine” of the Atlantic cycle of accumulation, the
force that expands by tying more and more points into its nexus of power relations, into
its world of “Tyrants and Slaves,” and taxing them with its “Demands.” This is the
catastrophe of Mason & Dixon.
But the novel also offers a response in the face of this catastrophe. For one,
Mason & Dixon further carries out Benjamin’s project by not only showing us the
accumulation of time, but by searching through the historical debris of the past for
moments that, when put into constellation with a “now,” offer some kind of redemptive
hope for the future. In other words, the novel recognizes the “what-has-been” of “the
Day” consolidating itself across the Atlantic, but it also strives to reveal a “what-mighthave-been” that is against the hegemony of “the Day.” This seems to be precisely what is
being described in Cherrycoke’s narration when he asks “Does Britannia, when she
sleeps, dream? Is America her dream?”
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For Cherrycoke, when America was “not yet mapp’d, nor written down, nor ever,
by the majority of Mankind, seen,” it was a “very Rubbish-Tip for subjunctive Hopes, for
all that may yet be true,— Earthly Paradise, Fountain of Youth, Realms of Prester John,
Christ’s Kingdom, ever behind the sunset” (345). But America as a space of “subjunctive
Hopes” disappeared as soon as its territories were “seen and recorded, measur’d and tied
in, back into the Net-Work of Points already known, that slowly triangulates its Way into
the Continent, changing all from subjunctive to declarative, reducing Possibilities to
Simplicities that serve the ends of Governments.” In other words, once “the Day”
expanded its control over America, once the Atlantic cycle of accumulation “slowly
triangulated its Way into the Continent,” all was lost. Or, all was nearly lost, because this
past moment of subjunctive hope is still what “may yet be true”: it is an image of the past
that holds some hope of redemption for the future, even though it never did—or has yet
to—come to pass.
Additionally, Mason & Dixon, in arguing for a time that does not pass but
accumulates, is engaged in a project of counter-modernity that Baucom describes as a
politics of melancholy. He relates melancholy and mourning to the language of finance
capital: while mourning entails the exchange of one love-object for another, melancholy
resists this logic of exchange; to “reduce matters to a formula: mourning exchanges,
melancholy encrypts” (Baucom Specters 257). The general task of what Baucom calls
“the testamentary, melancholy realist counterdiscourse of modernity” is to “recover the
lost, to acknowledge and take some affective property in the ruinous ‘past’ continuously,
if nonsynchronously, present within now-being” (Specters 218). He see this melancholy
counterdiscourse at work in the writings of eighteenth-century abolitionists and,
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especially, in the literature of the Black Atlantic, particularly Glissant, Derek Walcott,
Fred D’Aguiar, and Toni Morrison. It should come as no surprise that I would add Mason
& Dixon to this list.
Mason is the novel’s melancholic figure, and his personal encryptment of
Rebekah epitomizes the text’s Benjaminian and Glissantian philosophy of history. To
Cherrycoke, Mason must be “true to the sorrows of his own history…a way of keeping
them safe, and never betraying them” (316). Cherrycoke is thinking specifically of
Rebekah, but this is nonetheless a profound description of the project of the entire novel.
To be true to the sorrows of the “Collective Ghost,” of the past-time embodied in things
and the ghostliness of our present moment: this is what Mason & Dixon sets out to do.
Far more than simply disrupting or subverting historicity, the novel works to show us a
different philosophy of history, one that resists the exchange logic of capitalist modernity
and instead offers a commitment to the past, to the “what-has-been,” that will not forget,
will not let go. Mason says it best:
“…what if I can’t just lightly let her drop? What if I won’t just leave her to the
Weather, and Forgetfulness? What if I want to spend, even squander, my precious
time trying to make it up to her? Somehow? Do you think anyone can simply let
that all go?” (166).
Dixon does not say, “Thou must,” as the narrative suggests he could. Instead, he tilts his
wine glass at Mason, “beams sympathetically,” and says, “Then tha must break thy
Silence, and tell me somewhat of her.” This is precisely Mason & Dixon’s project: to
“break the silence” of history and account for the “ghostly wounds” of the past, to enact a
partisan interestedness that refuses to let go of past injustices, to encrypt the “what-has-
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been” within the “now” of an Atlantic that will not leave its dead “to the Weather, and
Forgetfulness.”
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Conclusion
Accumulation(s) against Accumulation
Two texts, two encounters with the same historically specific logic: that of the
Atlantic cycle of capital accumulation. As I stated earlier, Moby-Dick and Mason &
Dixon are as alike as they different, and this certainly applies to how each is related to the
Atlantic cycle, and thus how we can understand each as Atlantic literature.
Moby-Dick is like the Pequod itself. Just as that ship ventures into the heart of the
ocean, into the stark and brutal reality of the sea, the novel ventures into the heart of the
circum-Atlantic world, into the core of its essence, to locate the moving center. As we
have seen, the results are complex. For while Moby-Dick does indeed reproduce the logic
of capital, it does not do so as we would expect working from a Lukácsian model.
Instead, the moving center is displaced and reproduced figuratively in Ahab, leaving the
empty shell of its rhetoric on Starbuck: Atlantic capitalism as contradiction. We would
never have seen this, though, without applying Lukács’s theory of realism, and would in
turn never have been able to reveal the fundamentally intimate relationship between
Moby-Dick and the Atlantic cycle of accumulation.
Mason & Dixon works differently. Instead of diving into the heart of the Atlantic
cycle, Pynchon’s novel traces it across space and, importantly, across time. Through
adopting a Benjaminian philosophy of history, the text reveals how the Atlantic cycle is
composed not of discrete and isolated past moments moving through the “empty,
homogenous” time of capitalist modernity, but rather of nonsynchronously
contemporaneous moments accumulating in the wake of a singular historical catastrophe.
That catastrophe, Pynchon’s “the Day,” is the Atlantic cycle of accumulation.
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Once we reveal the different ways in which each text is related to the Atlantic
cycle, we recognize another similarity. Both encounter the logic of capitalist
accumulation and respond in turn with an alternative form of accumulation. In MobyDick, we see a trend of literary accumulation (the “nonrealist” element) that seeks to
counteract the brutalizing reality of the logic of capitalist accumulation (uncovered by the
“realist” element). And in Mason & Dixon, we see an accumulative philosophy of history
that seeks to counteract the empty time of modernity which is itself a product of the logic
of capital (not unlike how commodity production works to erase and repudiate the pasttime of commodities). Perhaps Moby-Dick is less successful: the end result is, admittedly,
a somewhat confused and certainly contradictory text that does not fully redeem nor fully
reveal the material it seeks to portray. Mason & Dixon, however, takes its accumulative
philosophy of history and turns it into a politics of melancholy, and in doing so,
articulates a discourse that is against capitalist modernity, against the brutality of Atlantic
production, and against the logic of capital accumulation.
This is their common element, as literature of the Atlantic: Moby-Dick and Mason
& Dixon portray accumulation against accumulation, the logic of an alternative form of
accumulation against the logic of capital. And perhaps this is the project of all Atlantic
literature, to some degree or another.
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